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It's Time to Make Non-Economic or Citizen Standing
Take a Seat in "Religious Display" Cases'
I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Edmond v. Robinson2 the Supreme Court denied a
petition for writ of certiorari3 to the United States Court of Appeals
1. The term "religious display" is used in this comment only to refer to cases wherein
the challenged display is alleged to be "religious." In cases that deal with plaques, pictures or
monuments wherein the underlying cause of action is the Establishment Clause, defendants
should by no means state, admit, or aver that the "display" is of a religious nature. The
paradox of Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that if one can get past the
hurdle of standing, most likely the first element that must be dealt with under Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) is the secular purpose prong; therefore, one must
disavow that the display has a religious nature in order to survive the sourness of the Lemon
test. For example, in Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F3d 292, 302 (7th Cir. 2000) Judge Ripple
sounded the death knell that many courts have hammered on that were hostile to any type
of Ten Commandments display. That is, they invoke Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)
(per curiam) as a proposition for the unsupported assumption that there can be no valid
recitation of a secular legislative purpose behind the posting of a Ten Commandments
display because the Commandments are "undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and
Christian faiths." See Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993); ICLU, Inc. v.
O'Bannon, 110 F Supp. 2d 842 (S.D. Ind. 2000); ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F Supp. 2d
679 (E.D. Ky. 2000); and ACLU v. Pulaski County, 96; F Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Adiand
v. Russ, 107 F Supp. 2d 782 (E.D. Ky. 2000). Stone is the only Supreme Court case dealing
with the Ten Commandments and it was decided without oral argument or briefs on the
merits. Justice Rehnquist launched a vigorous dissent because of the Court's rejection of the
secular purpose articulated by the Kentucky legislature. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist stated
that:
[w]ith no support beyond its own ipse dixit, the Court concludes that the Kentucky
statute involved in this case "has no secular purpose," and that "the pre-eminent
purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious
in nature." This even though, as the trial court found, "the General Assembly thought
the statute had a secular legislative purpose and specifically said so."
Stone, 449 U.S. at 43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2. 517 U.S. 1201 (1996).
3. Supreme Court Rule 10 lists three criteria that the Court finds important in deciding
whether to grant cert
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has
decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a
state court of last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for
an exercise of this Court's supervisory power,
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States
court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an important
question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has
decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions
of this Court.
SuP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c).
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for the Tenth Circuit that requested the Court to address the issue
of whether a city seal that includes a religious symbol therein
violates the Establishment Clause.4  Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented from the denial of certiorari5 noting a conflict in the
circuit courts on that very issue. In addition, the Chief Justice
would have required the parties to brief the issue as to whether the
plaintiffs had standing to be in federal court in the first place.
6
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
5. Aside from the split in the circuits, there is also a split amongst the Justices
regarding the practice of dissenting from denials of certiorari. See City of Elkhart v. Books,
121 S. Ct. 2209 (2001). Indeed, instead of the usual one line statement of denial, the Elkhart
denial is only one page shorter than the Court's decision in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980) (declaring that a statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky
public school classrooms violated the Establishment Clause). Justice Stevens "disfavors"
these dissents because he opines that they are rarely answered and "may include a less than
complete statement of the facts bearing on the question whether the case merits review."
City of Elkhart, 121 S. Ct. at 2209 (Stevens, J., statement respecting the denial of the petition
for writ of certiorari). Furthermore, Justice Stevens likened dissents from denial of certiorari
to "the purest form of dicta" and are misleading because they "typically appear to be more
persuasive than most other opinions." Id. at 2209 n.1 (quoting Singleton v. Comm'r, 439 U.S.
940 (1978)). Nevertheless, the very fact that Justice Stevens felt compelled to defend the
denial of certiorari in City of Elkhart is ample reason to continue the practice. A dissent
from denial of certiorari, although it may not have any "precedential significance," alerts the
public that certain Justices felt that the case warranted consideration. Moreover, like the
dissent from a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari, the denial itself has no precedential
value, i.e., the fact that the Supreme Court refused to hear a case should not be interpreted
as a stamp of approval for the way that the case was decided. See Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (stating that the sole significance of denial of petition
for writ of certiorari by United States Supreme Court is that fewer than four members of
Court have deemed it desirable to review decision of lower court as matter of sound judicial
discretion). Thus, the practice of dissenting from denials of petitions for writ of certiorari
should not be criticized for the reasons proffered by Justice Stevens, to the contrary, it
should be embraced as providing knowledge to the public that there is a significant
disagreement by one or more Justices as to the importance of hearing the case.
6. The standing to sue doctrine is as follows:
"Standing to sue" means that party has sufficient at stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. Standing is a concept
utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable
controversy is presented to the court; it is the right to take the initial step that frames
the legal issues for ultimate adjudication by court or jury. The requirement of
"standing" is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectible and
tangible interest at stake in the litigation. Standing is a jurisdictional issue that
concerns power of federal courts to hear and decide cases and does not concern
ultimate merits of substantive claims involved in the action. The doctrine emanates
from the case or controversy requirement of the Constitution and from general
principles of judicial administration, and seeks to insure that the plaintiff has alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure concrete
adverseness.
Standing is a requirement that the plaintiffs have been injured or been threatened
with injury by governmental action complained of, and focuses on the question of
whether the litigant is the proper party to fight the lawsuit, not whether the issue
itself is justiciable. Essence of standing is that no person is entitled to assail the
constitutionality of an ordinance or statute except as he himself is adversely affected
by it
BLACK's LAW DICIONARY 978 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
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Indeed, since 1990, the Court has emphasized that "the question of
standing is not subject to waiver: 'We are required to address the
issue even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even if
the parties fail to raise the issue before us.' "7 Thus, the Chief
Justice recognized that the courts of appeals are in disagreement as
to whether a plaintiff has incurred an injury sufficient to confer
standing merely by reason that he has "been exposed to a state
symbol that offends his beliefs."8  Considering the enormous
potential for endless litigation over religious symbols or displays in
public places, the Court should provide guidance on this vital issue
before the federal courts are flooded with lawsuits that consume
vital judicial resources.9
U1. COLLEGE DEBATING FORUMS?
One reason that the Court should address the non-economic
standing issue in religious display cases is its pronouncement in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation
of Church and State, Inc.1° that the language of Article Im of the
7. City of Edmund, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 801 (citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742
(1995); quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990)).
8. City of Edmund, 134 L Ed. 2d at 802 (citing Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.
2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging the difference of opinion in how the circuit courts
interpret Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982)); see also Freedom From Religion v. Zielke, 845 F 2d 1463
(7th Cir. 1988) (holding that mere exposure to a symbol that offends one's beliefs is
insufficient to confer standing); cf. Hawley v. City of Cleveland, 773 E2d 736 (6th Cir. 1985)
(finding that mere exposure is sufficient).
9. In the past decade alone there has been a proliferation of cases involving public
displays of the Ten Commandments. See Modrovich v. Allegheny County, Pa., No. 01-531
(W.D. Pa. filed Mar. 20, 2001); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000); Adland
v. Russ, 107 F. Supp. 2d 782, 784 (E.D. Ky. 2000); ACLU v. Pulaski County, Ky., 96 F. Supp. 2d
691, 694 (E.D. Ky. 2000); ACLU v. McCreary County, Ky., 96 F Supp. 2d 679, 682-83 (E.D. Ky.
2000); Doe v. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 E Supp. 2d 667, 669-71 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Kimbley v.
Lawrence County, Ind., 119 F Supp. 2d 856, 864 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Ind. Civil liberties Union,
Inc. v. O'Bannon, 110 F Supp. 2d 842, 847 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Suhre v. Haywood County, 131
F3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997); Ala. Freethought Ass'n v. Moore, 893 F Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala 1995);
Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993). In addition, the organization
Americans United for Separation of Church and State ("AU") makes no apologies that it
intends to push its agenda of complete separation of church and state through court action.
About AU, at http://www.au.org/about/htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2001). A review of AU's web
site acknowledges that its agenda includes religious display cases. AU lists many of the
above cases, as well as several other cases, in an article called "Legal Battles Over
Government Display Of The Decalogue Are Brewing Nationwide" Rob Boston, July/August
2001 Church & State Magazine, Commandments Controversies, at http://www.au.org/
churchstate/cs7014.htm.
10. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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United States Constitution" forecloses the federal courts to
potential litigants except where there is an actual case or
controversy. 2 Although the Court has acknowledged that it has not
clearly articulated certain features of the "standing" doctrine, i.e.,
whether they are actually required by Article I or whether they
are Court imposed requirements, the Court has always required
that a litigant possess "standing" to bring an action in federal
court.'3 As early as 1851, the Court acknowledged that it had no
power to hear disputes unless such "judicial power was granted by
the Constitution to the courts of the United States."
14
Valley Forge is the only case with an underlying Establishment
Clause claim, wherein the sole issue addressed by the Supreme
Court was Article I standing. Subsequent interpretation by the
circuit and district courts in the United States has been far from
uniform. The majority of those courts have stretched the language
of Valley Forge beyond recognition when faced with the standing
issue in an Establishment Clause claim. Despite paying homage to
the letter of Valley Forge, courts in the majority of circuits have
misconstrued its rationale, and distinguished it into oblivion, even
though they are bound by its precedent under the doctrine of stare
decisis.'5 As a result, litigants in religious display cases are granted
11. "The judicial power shall extend to all cases... arising under this Constitution...
and . .. to controversies." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
12. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473. The Court stated that "[t]he federal courts have
abjured appeals to their authority which would convert the judicial process into 'no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). Cf. n.8 supra. Furthermore, the Court added that:
Were the federal courts merely publicly funded forums for the ventilation of public
grievances or the refinement of jurisprudential understanding, the concept of'
"standing" would be quite unnecessary. But the "cases and controversies" language of
Art. III forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial versions
of college debating forums.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 471. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
14. United States v. Ferreira, 15 U.S. 40, 48 (13 How. 40) (1851).
15. Stare decisis is defined as follows:
Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point Doctrine that,
when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same.
Under doctrine a deliberate or solemn decision of court made after argument on
question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an
authority, or binding precedent in the same court, or in other courts of equal or lower
rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy. Doctrine is one
of policy, grounded on theory that security and certainty require that accepted and
established legal principle, under which rights may accrue, be recognized and
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Article III standing who have not suffered any type of injury other
than a disagreement with how they believe the Establishment
Clause is interpreted. The survey of cases outlined in the following
sections will demonstrate the tortured application of Valley Forge.
Indeed, one court has gone so far to state that a plaintiff need not
even see the religious display because "even if I don't see it, I
certainly know it is there."
16
Before examining the cases that purport to apply Valley Forge,
one should be aware of the essential elements of standing to sue in
federal court, as well as the policies at issue. The crucial element
involved in non-economic standing is the concept of an
"injury-in-fact."17 Thus, what does or does not constitute an "injury"
sufficient to confer standing in religious display cases is at the
heart of the controversy. One type of injury that has been held NOT
sufficient to establish standing is a constitutional right to a
government that does not establish religion.' 8 This alleged injury is
followed, though later found not to be legally sound, but whether previous holding of
court shall be adhered to, modified, or overruled is within court's discretion under
circumstances of case before it. Under doctrine, when point of law has been settled
by decision, it forms precedent, which is not afterwards to be departed from, and,
while it should ordinarily be strictly adhered to, there are occasions when departure is
rendered necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued
injustice. The doctrine is not ordinarily departed from where decision is of
long-standing and rights have been acquired under it, unless considerations of public
policy demand it. The doctrine is limited to actual determinations in respect to
litigated and necessarily decided questions, and is not applicable to dicta or obiter
dicta.
BLACK'S LAW DicToN.sY 1414 (7th ed. 1999).
16. Books, 235 F3d at 297. Taken to its logical conclusion, this seventh circuit ruling
would allow a person in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania who knows of, and objects to a religious
display anywhere in the jurisdiction of the seventh circuit, to file a lawsuit in federal district
court because he "knows it is there."
17. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Valley Forge stated that "Art Ill
requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant.'" Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
18. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-84. The Court noted that time and time again it has
rejected claims of standing based on "the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that
the Government be administered according to law. .. ." Id. at 482-83 (quoting Fairchild v.
Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962)). The Court
emphatically stated that "[tihe proposition that all constitutional provisions are enforceable
by any citizen simply because citizens are the ultimate beneficiaries of those provisions has
no boundaries." Id. at 485 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 227 (1974)). Indeed, the Court opined that:
Were we to recognize standing premised on an "injury" consisting solely of an alleged
violation of a "'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish
religion," a principled consistency would dictate recognition of respondents' standing
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nothing more than a generalized grievance common to all citizens.
As the majority in Valley Forge recognized, a claim of this type is
nothing more than an attempt "to employ a federal court as a
forum in which to air... generalized grievances about the conduct
of government."19
Closely related to the above concept was the Court's rejection of
the theory, proffered by the court of appeals in Valley Forge,20 that
"Art. III burdens diminish as the 'importance' of the claim on the
merits increases."21 The issues that a party wishes to adjudicate are
not the focus of whether a party has standing. To the contrary, the
main issue is whether a party has suffered a palpable injury to
himself that was caused by the complained of governmental act
that may be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.22 In other
words, unless one can show a distinct, palpable injury apart from
the "merits" of one's case, one has not satisfied the most basic
requirement to have standing to sue in federal court.23
to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal right to a
government that does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to
challenge every affirmative-action program on the basis of a personal right to a
government that does not deny equal protection of the laws, to choose but two of
among as many possible examples as there are commands in the Constitution.
Id. at 489 n.26 (internal citation omitted).
19. Id. at 483 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
20. Americans United v. U.S. Dept. of HEW, 619 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980).
21. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484. Indeed, the Court opined that "we know of no
principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values or a complementary
'sliding scale' of standing which might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of
the United States." Id.
22. Id. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (holding that petitioners lacked standing because,
although they were part of a class that allegedly had been discriminated against, none of
them could show how they were personally injured by the complained of governmental
conduct).
23. This proposition is well illustrated by the following dialogue from the oral
argument in Valley Forge:
QUESTION: Well, on your theory, then, on your theory members of Jehovah's
Witnesses and other religious people who sincerely are opposed to all forms of
warfare and defense, military establishment, would have standing to challenge the
levying of a tax on them to the extent that tax was used to buy tanks and airplanes
and other things. Is that right?
MR. BOOTHBY: Well, perhaps they have standing. The question then would be raised
as to what the compelling state interest might be, and how -
QUESTION: Well, all we are concerned here with now, we are talking about standing,
aren't we?
MR. BOOTHBY: Yes, the question in that case -
QUESTION: We are not getting to the merits of this case.
QUESTION: What is the injury in fact?
MR. BOOTHBY: Injury in fact in this particular case is that type of injury which is
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experienced by many people in this country, but the fact that government is not being
neutral and establishing an environment which prevents a government operating with
a separation of church and state.
QUESTION: Well, is that the sort of injury in fact that Barlows or Associated
Processing was concerned with?
MR. BOOTHBY: Well, of course, those were concerned with economic problems.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. BOOTHBY: But in Data Processing the Court specifically indicated that what it
said in that case also applied to spiritual values, and we are dealing here with a
spiritual value, not an economic value.
QUESTION: Mr. Boothby, along that same line, can you argue your case on standing
without the merits, because you say that unless this is a church school, you have no
case.
MR. BOOTHBY: I don't think one -
QUESTION: Well, if this is a school that is completely non-sectarian, do you have
standing?
MR. BOOTHBY: I think that in order to reach the standing question, as the Court said
in Flast, to find out if there is a nexus between the plaintiff and the injury, that you
have to look at the facts in that fashion, but you do not need to cross the threshold
and decide the merits of the case. You do not need to determine whether in fact this
is a pervasively sectarian institution, merely look to see whether there is an allegation
QUESTION: Then you have to get to the merits. You would rather call it facts, but I
prefer to call it merits.
MR. BOOTHBY: I think you have to look to see whether there is an allegation raised
by the plaintiff that there is a pervasively sectarian institution involved, but you need
not decide that fact.
QUESTION: But you have to get to it.
MR. BOOTHBY: To that extent.
QUESTION: If this was a non-sectarian institution, you would have no case.
MR. BOOTHBY: Well, there would not be the claim of establishment violation.
QUESTION: You would not have any standing, would you?
MR. BOOTHBY: You would not, and that would probably be a political question at
that point.
QUESTION: You wouldn't have any standing.
MR. BOOTHBY: That's true.
QUESTION: We are talking about standing now. I would like to leave it with standing.
I have great problems with where your line is drawn. I can allege that my religion is
against taxing, so I want to stop paying my income tax. I don't have standing for that.
MR. BOOTHBY: I think then you reach the question of whether it is a burden on the
free exercise rights of those people. I think you have to look to that issue, and then
the question of sincerity. Now, perhaps they would have standing to raise the
question.
QUESTION: And they could plead forma pauperis and it wouldn't cost them a nickel
to do it. Right?
QUESTION: Mr. Boothby, I have been looking at your complaint. What provision of
the complaint ... contains your allegation of injury in fact?
MR. BOOTHBY: Paragraph 12 is the one that deals with the claimed violation of the
establishment clause.
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Another significant pronouncement of Valley Forge is that
psychological offense at governmental conduct that one disagrees
with is insufficient to confer standing to a would-be litigant.24
Immaterial to that Court was the notion that just because
Americans United were zealous advocates of separation of church
and state, this somehow conferred standing upon it to litigate
Establishment Clause claims.25 Additionally, it was irrelevant in
Valley Forge that the plaintiffs were based in Washington, D.C. and
the complained of transfer of land was in Pennsylvania. 26 In other
words, proximity to the alleged unconstitutional governmental
conduct, without injury, is an insufficient basis to allege standing.
Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court has decided
establishment clause cases that involved holiday displays, does not
stand for the proposition that any plaintiff who wishes to challenge
a similar display, automatically has standing. Several courts
mentioned in the subsequent section have found this fact
persuasive. Nonetheless, standing is not conferred by the type of
case being adjudicated, but is granted on the basis that a party has
suffered a palpable injury.
Finally, the Court dismissed the argument made by Americans
United in Valley Forge to the effect that if they do not have
standing, "who will?":
QUESTION: Is there any allegation in here other than that, which seems to relate to
status as taxpayers, that indicates an injury in fact to these particular plaintiffs?
MR. BOOTHBY: Not in the complaint, Your Honor....
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, No.
80-327, 1981 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 9, at *32-33, *38-42, *45-46 (U.S. Oral Arg. Nov. 4, 1981).
24. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86. Americans United was unable to identify any type
of injury "other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of
conduct with which one disagrees." Id. at 485. The Court held that this type of "injury" was
woefully insufficient to confer standing under Article III. Id.
25. Id. at 486. Justice Rehnquist opined that "standing is not measured by the intensity
of the litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy." Id. Thus, although " 'concrete
adverseness . . . sharpens the presentation of issues,'" and may be the consequence of one
who has been injured in fact; "it is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury
itself." Id. at 486 (internal quotes Baker, 369 U.S. at 204).
26. Id. at 487 n.23. After stating that these plaintiffs do not have a license to roam the
country in search of establishment clause violations, the court noted that:
Respondent Americans United claims that it has certain unidentified members who
reside in Pennsylvania. It does not explain, however, how this fact establishes a
cognizable injury where none existed before. Respondent is still obligated to
allege facts sufficient to establish that one or more of its members has suffered, or is
threatened with, an injury other than their belief that the transfer violated the
Constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
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This philosophy has no place in our constitutional scheme....
Respondents' claim of standing implicitly rests on the
presumption that violations of the Establishment Clause
typically will not cause injury sufficient to confer standing
under the "traditional view of Art. III. But "the assumption
that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."
[W]e are unwilling to assume that injured parties are
nonexistent simply because they have not joined respondents
in their suit.
27
Thus, absent any allegations that Plaintiffs have truly suffered some
type of palpable injury from the plaque, reliance upon the political
process is not only proper; it is totally consistent with our form of
government.
III. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT CASES RE: NON-ECONOMIC STANDING
A survey of the various circuits in which standing has been
challenged in Establishment Clause cases reveals that most courts
of appeals do not set a very high threshold for meeting standing
requirements in religious display and/or Establishment Clause
cases. As a result, those courts have opened the federal judiciary to
be the master legislators on whether states and local governments
are establishing religions by displaying plaques, pictures, and/or
monuments that have significant historical richness. Nevertheless,
standing should be challenged in religious display cases upon the
appropriate facts, especially in light of the fact that the Supreme
Court has not spoken specifically on this issue in the religious
symbolism context. Four Supreme Court decisions appear in most
of the decisions analyzing this issue; they are: Abington School
District v. Schempp;2s United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP'9; 29 Valley Forge; and
27. Id. at 489 (quoting Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227) (emphasis added). The Court in
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) went one step further stating:
In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other conclusion
would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of
an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of
the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts.
Id. at 179.
28. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
29. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
2002
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.3° The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that direct, repeated
contact with an "offensive" display constitutes an injury sufficient
to confer standing under Valley Forge. The District of Columbia
Circuit, First, Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
seem to indicate that something more is needed besides direct
contact to establish an injury sufficient to confer Article III
standing.
A. District of Columbia
In Swomley v. Watt,' the district court held that plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue the Department of the Interior over the use of
federal monies to erect various religious symbols and maintain
grounds known as the "Holy City" near Lawton, Oklahoma.32 Here,
in the pre-Valley Forge era, the plaintiffs relied upon a two-pronged
test stated by the Court in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.3 In order to have standing, this test
required a plaintiff to "allege 'injury in fact, economic or otherwise,'
to an interest 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.'"4 On the one hand, the plaintiffs argued that spiritual
values are within the zone of interests protected by the
Establishment Clause. On the other hand, the defendants argued
that the plaintiffs alleged no concrete and particular injury to
themselves, and that neither emotional involvement, nor mere
interest in a problem is a sufficient basis upon which to predicate
standing.35 Although the court noted that standing had recently
been interpreted more broadly in Establishment Clause cases, an
allegation of particular, concrete injury to the qualifying interest is
still required.36 In Swomley, the court noted that even if "a concern
for religious freedom and a right to a government separate from
religion,37 may be within the zone of interests cognizable as a basis
30. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
31. 526 F. Supp. 1271 (D.D.C. 1981).
32. Swomley, 526 F Supp. at 1272, 1275.
33. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
34. Swomley, 526 F Supp. at 1273 (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152-53).
35. Id. at 1274.
36. Id. See also Southern Mutual Help Ass'n v. Califano, 574 F2d 518 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(stating that the injury must be specifically alleged by the plaintiff, must be particularized,
and it must be capable of direct redress by the court through the requested remedy).
37. The Court in Valley Forge expressly rejected this notion stating:
Were we to recognize standing premised on an "injury" consisting solely of an alleged
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for citizen standing under the Establishment Clause," plaintiffs
nonetheless did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.38 Here,
only two of the four plaintiffs alleged that they had seen the site:
one, a farmer who traveled frequently on a highway adjacent to it,
and another who visited Holy City for research purposes.3 9 The
other two plaintiffs only claimed to be "seriously concerned about
the separation of church and state" and the court found that they
had presented nothing more than "generalized grievances"
insufficient to assert a public interest in a constitutional claim.
40
In the case of Fordyce v. Frohnmayer,41 the district court held
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an art exhibition
partially sponsored by the National Endowment for the Arts. The
court began its analysis by turning to Valley Forge which, stated
that in order for a citizen to have standing to sue the person must
allege: (1) an injury in fact; (2) caused by, or traceable to, the
challenged action; and (3) which injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable judicial decision.42 The court noted that the first
element requires an injury to be immediate, objective, and
concrete, not speculative or abstract.43 Moreover, the court opined
that the mere assertion of a "spiritual injury" under the
establishment clause principle was insufficient to support
standing.44 Instead, the court found persuasive a couple of earlier
seventh Circuit decisions, ACLU v. City of St. Charles,45 and
Freedom From Religious Foundation, Inc., v. Zielke,46  that
required some type of alteration in behavior as requisite to
violation of a "'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish
religion," a principled consistency would dictate recognition of respondents' standing
to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a government that
does not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to challenge every
affirmative-action program on the basis of a personal right to a government that does
not deny equal protection of the laws, to choose but two among as many possible
examples as there are commands in the Constitution.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489 n.26.
38. Swomley, 526 F Supp. at 1275.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 763 F Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1991).
42. Fordyce, 763 F. Supp. at 655 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).
43. Id. at 656 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Iyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983)).
44. Id. (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486-87 n.22). The court distinguished the
Supreme Court's standing analysis in Abington School District because in that case,
"impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were
forced to assume special burdens to avoid them." Id. at 656 n.1.
45. 794 F2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
46. 845 F2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988).
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establish standing.47 Indignation of a government act that one
violently disapproves of is not the type of injury that supports
standing.4 Indeed, in Fordyce, the court found that the plaintiffs'
allegations boiled down to nothing more than a spiritual injury
caused by a display that offended their religious sensibilities.
Significantly, there were no allegations that the plaintiffs
confronted the display daily, that the display was visible during
their normal routine, or that their usual driving or walking routes
took them past the display. Finally, the plaintiffs had not alleged
that they ever saw the display or endured any special burdens that
justify standing to sue.
49
B. First Circuit
The case of DonneUy v. Lynch 5° addressed the standing issue;
however, it did so primarily in the municipal taxpayer context. In
Donnelly, it was undisputed that the City of Pawtucket used
taxpayer money to maintain the creche.5 1 Nevertheless, the
defendants argued that Valley Forge significantly limited a
municipal taxpayer's standing to sue.52 The court disagreed, noting
that although the Supreme Court has recognized a dichotomy in the
manner it treats federal, as opposed to municipal, taxpayers for
standing purposes, Valley Forge has not eliminated that distinction.
Thus, a taxpayer of a municipality has an interest in the application
of his tax money, which is direct and immediate, and the remedy
by injunction to prevent its misuse is not inappropriate.5
Although the court did not base its decision on "citizen" standing
because it had found that the plaintiffs had municipal taxpayer
standing, the court briefly commented on non-economic citizen
47. In City of St. Charles, the court found that plaintiffs had standing, not because they
were deeply offended by a religious display, but because they were forced to alter their
behavior to avoid contact with the display. City of St. Charles, 794 F2d at 268. Likewise, in
Zielke, the appellants conceded that they did not alter their behavior to avoid a Ten
Commandments monument, only that they suffered a rebuke to their religious beliefs. Zielke,
845 F2d at 1468-69. Thus, the court held that appellants lacked standing to bring suit. Id.
The Fordyce court also noted that the Sixth Circuit held that even if a plaintiff could have
avoided an "unwelcome religious exercise," the fact that they took special burdens to do so
was sufficient to confer standing. Hawley v. City of. Cleveland, 773 F 2d 736, 740 (6th Cir.
1985).
48. Fordyce, 763 F Supp. at 656 (citing City of St. Chares, 794 F2d at 268).
49. Id.
50. 691 F2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
51. Donnelly, 691 F2d at 1030.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1031 (citing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923)).
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standing. Addressing Valley Forge, the court noted that the
Supreme Court reasoned that an assertion of a personal
constitutional right to a government that does not establish religion
is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III as an
identifiable personal injury.54 Thus, any psychological consequence
produced by observation of conduct that one disagrees with is
insufficient to confer standing upon an individual even if that
disagreement may be phrased in constitutional terms and even if
the potential litigant has intense constitutional beliefs.55 The court
noted that Valley Forge was careful to distinguish Schempp because
of the impressionable schoolchildren in Schempp who were
subjected to unwelcome religious services or forced to assume
special burdens to avoid them.
56
C. Second Circuit
The court in Sullivan v. Syracuse Housing Authority,57 ("SHA")
reversed a district court decision that had dismissed plaintiffs
Establishment Clause claim for lack of standing. Sullivan, a Native
American, and not of Christian religion, alleged that SHA
unconstitutionally supported Christianity at the Benderson Heights
community center.58 Here, Sullivan alleged that he was deprived of
the use of the "public housing facilities" because of the "religious
policy" of SHA.59 The court noted that for constitutional standing
purposes, the "actual or threatened injury" alleged need not be
economic or monetary in nature.60 The court also stated that the
Supreme Court has recognized that a party "may have a spiritual
stake in First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise
issues concerning the Establishment Clause."6' Furthermore, the
court found that the injury must be "distinct and palpable," and not
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. DonneUy, 691 F2d at 1031.
57. 962 F2d 1101 (2nd Cir. 1992).
58. Sullivan, 962 F2d at 1103.
59. Id. at 1108.
60. Id. at 1107 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486).
61. Id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154). Here, the court also cited Valley
Forge for this proposition; however, Valley Forge explicitly stated that a plaintiff's "spiritual
stake" that would be sufficient to confer standing cannot be read apart from the context that
the term was used in. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22. The term arose in the case of
Abington School District and the Court expounded in Valley Forge that the plaintiffs in
Abington had standing not because their claim rested on the Establishment Clause, "but
because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or
were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them." Id.
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"'abstract' or 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' "62 Thus, the party
asserting the "injury" must have a "direct and personal stake in the
controversy" and not merely using the judicial process for the
"vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders."63
The court stated that Sullivan's complaint alleged that he had
been deprived of his right to use and enjoy the community center.1
4
In addition, the complaint alleged that religion had been established
in a place analogous to his home, and that he finds the
establishment of religion offensive. 65 Hence, the court stated that
Sullivan had a direct and personal stake in the controversy, alleged
injuries sufficiently distinct, palpable and concrete to constitute an
"actual injury," and that he is not a simple bystander using the
courts to vindicate abstract value interests, or a mere citizen
complaining of the nonobservance by others of the Constitution.
Finally, the court noted that his alleged injuries were not simply
noncognizable psychological consequences produced by ob-
servation of personally disagreeable conduct.66
D. Third Circuit
In Cavileer v. City of Pittsburgh,67 the court held that plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the granting of an access channel to
the Christian Associates of Southwest Pennsylvania ("CASP") by
Warner Cable Corporation, who in turn had been awarded a
franchise for cable television in the City of Pittsburgh." In this
case, the plaintiffs argued that the City's apparent or intentional
support of CASP resulted in the discrimination against them and
that CASP's receipt of $60,000 and a channel from Warner had
caused them to suffer an injury.69 The court began its analysis by
62. SulUivan, 962 F.2d at 1107 (citations omitted).
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 1105. Plaintiff, who had been president of the tenants' association, resigned
his position because of certain programs of the SHA alleged to "bring Jesus Christ" to the
residents. Id. Additionally, one of plaintiffs children "was taught to sing Christian hymns by
the director while the child was participating in recreational activities at the Center. Id.
Because of these allegations, plaintiff states that his use and enjoyment of the public housing
facilities has been denied. Id.
65. Id. at 1107.
66. Id.
67. 569 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (Mansmann, J.).
68. Cavileer, 569 F. Supp. at 210.
69. Id. at 210-11. Plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin the City from enforcing the
agreement between the city and Warner because the city would be required to confer on
CASP that which CASP had previously contracted for with Warner and, because of this, the
city has become entangled with a religious organization which creates the appearance of
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noting that standing requires a party to "show that he personally
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly
can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision."70 In addition the court stated that a
claimant must assert his own legal rights and cannot stand on the
rights of third parties, nor may a court exercise its remedial powers
when it is confronted by a generalized grievance rather than a
particularized injury to the party before it.71 As an aside, the court
was dumbfounded as to why the plaintiffs alleged that they had
taxpayer standing, because a review of the entire record revealed
"not one shred of evidence that anything other than private monies
[had] been used in the Warner system."72 Thus, the court first held
that plaintiffs lacked taxpayer standing.
The next issue was whether the plaintiffs had alleged an injury in
fact sufficient to confer non-economic standing.73 The court was
emphatic in its reliance on Valley Forge and stated that "absent a
particularized injury different from that of the rights of the general
citizenry to require the government to conduct its affairs in
accordance with the law a party lacks standing under Article ll." 74
Judge Mansmann also emphasized that the Supreme Court had
made it clear that just "because the Establishment Clause was
in issue, [does not mean] that the standing requirements
under Article III were lessened."75 Consequently, the judge
concluded that although the plaintiffs had alleged a violation of the
Constitution, they had not alleged an injury in fact, and, hence,
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing
plaintiffs for lack of standing.
76
government support of a particular religious group. Id.
70. Id. at 211 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).
71. Id. (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475).
72. Id. at 212.
73. Cavileer, 569 F Supp. at 212.
74. Id. (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-83). Here, the court found that Cavileer's
church was located in the North Hills, which is not in the city limits, and that the church
was not a party to the lawsuit. Moreover, Cavileer did not allege that he was ever denied
membership in CASP. Plaintiff Houle contended that he was minister of the Metropolitan
Community Church of Pittsburgh and was informed that his church was ineligible for
membership in CASP. Plaintiff Lane merely alleged that he was a taxpayer and a potential
subscriber to Warner. He did not claim affiliation with any church or that he sought or was
denied membership in CASP. Thus, the court dismissed Lane as not having standing. Id.
75. Id. (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 484).
76. Id. at 213. The court found that "[n]one of the three named plaintiffs have claimed
that they approached CASP for the purpose of presenting a program of his own over CASP's
channel" or that if they applied, that their request would be denied. Id.
2002
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The district court in Americans United for Separation of Church
and State v. Reagan," made some beneficial observations on its
interpretation of the standing issue as enunciated by the Court in
Valley Forge. In this case, plaintiffs complaint was dismissed for
lack of standing for being unable to identify any particular
"injury-in-fact."8 In relevant part, the court stated that Valley Forge
established that "a litigant has no standing to complain about
actual or threatened violations of the Constitution... unless such
violation directly injures that litigant, as distinguished from the
public at large" and "there is no relaxation of standing
requirements merely because violations of the First
Amendment are alleged."79 Significantly, the court noted, "a
citizen does not have standing to litigate alleged violations of the
Establishment Clause merely because of an interest in achieving a
just society in which church-state separationist values are
preserved."8° Importantly, the court acknowledged its obligation to
follow the mandate of Valley Forge.81 Hence, the court dismissed
the complaint because there was no particularized injury-in-fact.
82
77. 607 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Pa 1985).
78. Americans United, 607 F Supp. at 751.
79. Id. at 750 (emphasis added). Here, plaintiffs challenged the re-establishment of
diplomatic relations between the United States and the Holy See, as well as President
Reagan's appointment of William Wilson as the ambassador to the Vatican. Plaintiffs tried in
vain to establish an injury-in-fact, alleging in part:
The spiritual and moral teachings of the Catholic faith . ..will be thrust into the
public limelight and the political arena in a manner not available to other religions.
The Catholic Church will be better able to compete in the religious market place, with
corresponding loss of membership and revenue for other religious denominations,
because of the actual or symbolic preference Mr. Wilson's appointment connotes....
Plaintiffs' religious beliefs and religious institutions are stigmatized because the
formalization of diplomatic relations with the Vatican makes it appear that the
Catholic Church is more important than other denominations. The establishment of
diplomatic relations with the Vatican will have an impact on government policies, and
plaintiffs and members of their congregations will be subjected to subtle, indirect
pressures to conform to their spiritual and moral beliefs and practices.
Id. In response to these allegations, the court stated that they were nothing more than a
statement of various reasons why plaintiffs felt that separation of church and state is a good
idea Id. at 751.
80. Id. at 751. Thus, the court reasoned that just because plaintiffs have strong feelings
on this subject does not entitle them to call upon the courts for relief. Id. The court further
noted that any allegation by the plaintiffs that the challenged actions have caused a decline
in membership or revenues of any of the plaintiffs' denominations or organizations would be
"patently frivolous." Id. Nor were there any allegations that plaintiffs or their organizations
have been required to pursue objectionable policies or goals. Id. The allegations merely
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Just recently, in ACLU-NJ v. Township of Wall,8 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated a decision by the district
court that a holiday display did not violate the Establishment
Clause, but nevertheless remanded for dismissal based on
appellants' lack of standing. Here, the court made some interesting
observations regarding municipal taxpayer standing in addition to
its analysis of the citizen standing issue. In Wall, the ACLU rested
its standing upon its members, the Millers; thus, it was up to the
Millers to establish standing in either capacity.s4 The court first
discussed municipal taxpayer standing by analyzing Doremus v.
Board of Education.5 The court looked to other circuits86 as well
and concluded that even if the Township paid its employees to
erect the display and spent money lighting the display, it would still
result in no more than a de minimis expenditure insufficient to
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
8 7
Next, the court addressed standing based upon non-economic
injuries. The litigation first involved a 1998 display in which both,
Mr. and Mrs. Miller, had numerous contacts with. They testified
that they "frequently visit the municipal complex to fulfill personal,
professional, and political responsibilities."M Mr. Miller stated that
he believed that the display demonstrated that the Township was
closely related to the Christian religion and that it had no business
erecting a display of only one religion.8 9 In addition, he averred that
the display was "an affront to and rejection of [his] political and
philosophical beliefs and an intrusion into the area of [his]
religion."90 Likewise, Mrs. Miller stated that the display was an
83. No. 00-2075, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700 (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 2001).
84. Wall, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700 at *6.
85. 342 U.S. 429 (1952). In Doremus, the Court stated that although a municipal
taxpayer may possess standing to litigate "a good-faith pocketbook action," the plaintiffs
failed to establish a direct monetary injury that would confer standing to raise such a
challenge because at best, there was no more than a "potential de minimis drain on tax
revenues due to the challenged [Bible] reading." Wall, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700 at *8-10
(quoting Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430-433).
86. Most notably, the court cites the Seventh Circuit case of Zielke with approval in
which plaintiffs case was dismissed for lack of standing because even though the defendant
city had spent money in 1899 to acquire property for a park in which a Ten Commandments
monument was displayed, "the city had not spent any funds on maintaining the
donated monument." Wa//, 2001 U.S. App. 5700 at "10-11. The approval of the continued
validity of this case is important mainly for the citizen or non-economic standing aspect of
the issue.
87. Wa/l, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700 at *13-14.
88. Id. at *14.




endorsement of the Christian religion and that she believes in the
prohibition against the establishment of religion.9' She stated that
she was not anti-religious but felt that the display was a rejection
of her political views and beliefs respecting the necessity for
religious diversity and inclusivity and that the display made her feel
"less welcome in the community, less accepted and tainted in some
way."92 The district court found that this evidence sufficed for
establishing standing on behalf of the Miller's.
The Court of Appeals, however, noted that the question was a
close one.93 The court stated that a valid argument could be made
that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were nothing more than
"psychological consequences . . . produced by observation of
conduct with which one disagrees" and not sufficient to establish
standing.94 On the other hand, the court cited the Tenth Circuit
case of Foremaster v. City of St. George,95 and the Eleventh Circuit
case of Saladin v. City of Milledgeville,96 as examples of circuits
that found standing based on direct and personal contact with an
"offensive" display.9 Nevertheless, the court's decision was only
directed at the 1999 display in which Mr. Miller testified that he
saw the display, but it was unclear as to whether he observed it for
purposes of the litigation or whether he was satisfying a civic
obligation at the municipal building.98 In addition, there was no
evidence that Mrs. Miller even saw the 1999 display. Thus, the court
held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because their disagreement
with the display was not the type of injury that would confer
standing.9
E. Fourth Circuit
In Suhre v. Haywood County,'00 the district court addressed the
non-economic standing issue. Here, the "offensive" display was a
Ten Commandments plaque on either side of a Lady Justice
91. Id.
92. Wa//, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700 at *16.
93. Id. The court's discussion surrounding the 1998 display is mostly dicta because the
complaint was amended to include the 1999 display which, was the only display pursued on
appeal and necessary to the court's decision. Id. at *19-20.
94. Id. at *18 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485).
95. 882 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989).
96. 812 E2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987).
97. Wall, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5700 at *19.
98. Id. at *20.
99. Id.
100. Civil No. 1:94CV179 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5013 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 1997).
Vol. 40:313
2002 Standing in "Religious Display" Cases
bas-relief in a courtroom at the Haywood County Courthouse. 01
The court found that the Plaintiff's claim that he had standing by
virtue of a criminal conviction that may have been the result of the
presence of the Ten Commandments in the courtroom and that he
felt unwelcome in the courtroom, did not allege an "injury in
fact."1°2 These claims were simply akin to his belief that the
government shall have no right to make a law respecting the
establishment of a religion.1°3 The court disagreed with a Georgia
district court in the case of Harvey v. Cobb County'0 and found
that Valley Forge demands more than just unwelcome contact with
an offensive object to establish an injury for standing purposes. 05
The court noted that the Harvey court relied upon Schempp for
standing purposes.0 6 Finally, the court found that the plaintiff did
not have taxpayer standing because expenditures which the taxing
authority would incur even absent the allegedly unconstitutional
activity cannot satisfy the second element required under municipal
taxpayer standing. ' 7
Nevertheless, the court of appeals in Suhre v. Haywood
County'08 reversed the district court. In analyzing the standing
issue, the Fourth Circuit stated that although there is no
"sliding-scale" of standing in Establishment Clause cases, the
101. Suhre, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5013 at *34.
102. Id. at *15-16.
103. Id. The court found that there was no evidence that the plaque caused him injury.
Most notably, the court stated that voluntary attendance at meetings, either past or
prospective, do not meet the test of standing because the only injury which could result
would be the spiritual or psychological offense which has been soundly rejected by the
Court in Valley Forge. Plaintiff's allegation that he was injured because of his atheistic
character also failed. Id. at *23-26.
104. 811 F Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
105. Suhre, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5013 at *18. The court criticized the Harvey court
stating that
After citing the Valley Forge decision for the proposition that neither spiritual nor
psychological harm resulting from offensive contact is sufficient to establish standing,
the court went on to hold that the plaintiff's "'unwelcome' contact with the offensive
object is enough to establish injury for purposes of standing." This court cannot
resolve the discrepancy between the clear language of the Supreme Court decision
and the conclusion of the Georgia district court.
Id.
106. Id. at *19. Thus, the court distinguished Schempp because that case involved a law
that required participation in a religious exercise as opposed to occasional unwelcome
contact with an offensive object. Id.
107. Id. at *29-30. The court noted that the original expenditure and the renovation did
not count towards taxpayer standing in this case, because the unconstitutional activity
alleged is the continued maintenance of the display. Id.
108. 131 F3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997).
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inquiry has been tailored to reflect the type of injury those
plaintiffs are likely to suffer.1°9 Chief Judge Wilkinson echoed the
court in ACLU v. Rabun County"° and stated that it is "'the
spiritual, value-laden beliefs of the plaintiffs' [that] are often most
directly affected by an alleged establishment of religion.""' Here,
the court relied upon Schempp and distinguished Valley Forge
because there, plaintiffs had no direct contact with the alleged
establishment of religion.112  The court further opined that the
spiritual affront of unwelcome contact with religious symbolism
might also be compounded when the display that causes this
distress is located within a public facility."13 To summarize, the
circuit court held that direct contact with a religious display is
sufficient and that changed behavior is not necessary for purposes
of standing." 4
F Fifth Circuit
In Murray v. City of Austin,"5 the court held that plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the insignia of the City of Austin, Texas. The
court began its analysis by noting that for a litigant to establish
109. Suhre, 131 F3d at 1085-86.
110. 698 F.2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
111. Id. at 1086. According to Noah Webster, "the practice of moral duties without a
belief in a divine lawgiver, and without reference to his will or commands, is not a religion."
American Dictionary of the English Language, 1828.
112. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the flawed proposition that proximity to the
alleged offensive conduct is determinative of standing: Respondent Americans United claims
that it has certain unidentified members who reside in Pennsylvania. It does not explain,
however, how this fact establishes a cognizable injury where none existed before.
Respondent is still obligated to allege facts sufficient to establish that one or more of its
members has suffered, or is threatened with, an injury other than their belief that the
transfer violated the Constitution. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.23. Moreover, Valley Forge
stated that the plaintiffs in Schempp had standing because they were "forced to assume
special burdens to avoid [the religious exercises]." Id. at 486 n.22.
113. Suhre, 131 F3d at 1087.
114. Id. at 1089. The court here acknowledged that there is a split in the circuits
regarding the standing issue and specifically declined to follow Zielke in the Seventh Circuit
that stated that changed conduct was necessary to establish an "injury." Id. at 1087-88. The
court here cited County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) and Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984) as precedent for its holding because these Supreme Court cases
proceeded to the merits without any infirmity in plaintiffs' standing. Id. at 1088. However, in
Lynch, standing was predicated on municipal taxpayer standing and not non-economic
citizen standing. See Donnelly supra. The court noted that the plaintiff had two types of
personal contact, as a user of the courts and as a participant in local politics and
government Id. at 1090. Remarkably, the court goes so far as to uphold the plaintiffs
conjectural future sightings of the Ten Commandments plaques because he has shown his
desire to use the court system if necessary to vindicate his rights. Id. at 1091.
115. 947 F2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
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standing he must demonstrate: (1) that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant; (2) that the injury "fairly can be traced
to the challenged action"; and (3) that the injury "is likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision."1 6 Moreover, a court should
consider. (1) whether the plaintiff's complaint falls within the zone
of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision at
issue; (2) whether the complaint raises abstract questions
amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately
resolved by legislative branches; and (3) whether the plaintiff is
asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the
legal rights and interests of third parties."7 However, the court then
stated that "the concept of injury for standing purposes is
particularly elusive in Establishment Clause cases" and that Murray
had alleged sufficient injury to confer standing."8 The court placed
considerable weight on the "fact" that standing was not an issue in
Lynch or County of Alegheny."9
In Shea v. Brister,120 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the attorney/plaintiff did not have standing to challenge
a Ten Commandments display in Judge Brister's Harris County,
Texas courtroom. Municipal taxpayer standing was not much of an
issue in this case as there was no expenditure of public funds in
connection with the "acquisition, installation, preservation,
maintenance, or display" of the Commandments in the
courtroom.' 2' Addressing the citizen standing requirements, the
court reiterated the elements set forth in Murray."- Here, however,
116. Murray, 947 K2d at 151 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).
117. Id. (quoting Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1991)).
118. Id. (quoting Saladin, 812 F2d at 691). Murray's allegations were that he lives and
works in Austin, receives correspondence from the City, that he has visited the chambers of
the Austin City Council and the municipal building, the cross at issue is used only by the
Roman Catholic Church, the religious symbol "truly offends him," he does not subscribe to
that religious sect, he personally confronts the symbol at many locations, the use of the
symbol is an endorsement of Christianity and the Roman Catholic faith, that he did not
know that the cross was part of Austin's coat of arms until he did research, he experienced
police hostility in the past when he needed protection (he fears that this was a result of his
being a well-known atheist spokesperson), and he is distressed that his tax money is used to
advertise religion. Id. at 150.
119. Id. at 151-52. As for Lynch, see Donnelly supra the First Circuit and note 108
supra. In County of Allegheny, the Court must have satisfied itself that the plaintiffs had
standing, or, it would have lacked jurisdiction; however, its silence on the issue is certainly
not precedent that standing is a given in any similar type of case.
120. 26 F Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
121. Shea, 26 F Supp. 2d at 945.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
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the court denied standing because the mere possibility that Shea
could be exposed at some time in the future to the display in
Brister's courtroom was too remote to establish standing.12 The
court opined that the mere chance that one of Shea's cases might
be assigned to Brister or that he might one day be a litigant or
juror in that court was entirely conjecture. 124 Shea's argument that
if he did not have standing, then no one would be able to establish
standing failed also.1 25 The court stated that Valley Forge was the
seminal decision on standing and that Article III's requirements are
not satisfied by the "abstract injury in nonobservance of the
Constitution asserted by the citizens."126 Moreover, Shea's oath,
taken as an attorney, did not grant him the right to air generalized
grievances before the court.12 7 Therefore, the court distinguished
this case from Suhre and Harvey because in those cases, where
standing was allowed, the plaintiffs had direct and possible
continued contact with the display.'2
In Doe v. Beaumont Independent School District,2 9 although the
court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of standing to
the plaintiffs, the case is useful for distinguishing between Valley
Forge and Schempp. Here, plaintiffs sued for relief from a volunteer
clergy-counseling program at the school that plaintiffs alleged they
might be exposed to at sometime in the future.'3° The district court
had denied standing to plaintiffs based on the decision in Valley
Forge because the plaintiffs only presented a generalized public
grievance.' 3' Again, the court cited with approval the legal standard
outlined in the two cases supra and added that the actual injury
requirement ensures that issues will be resolved "not in the rarified
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual
context."32 In fact, the court cited Valley Forge with approval and
distinguished Schempp because, in Schempp, the parties were
school children and their parents, who were directly affected by
123. Shea, 26 F Supp. 2d at 945-46.
124. Id. at 946. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (stating that an injury must be "actual or
imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'" (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
155 (1990); quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102).
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482).
127. Shea, 26 F Supp. 2d at 946.
128. Id. at 947.
129. 173 F3d 274 (5th Cir. 1999).
130. Doe, 173 F 3d at 283-84.
131. Id. at 281.
132. Id. (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).
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the laws and practices complained of.1 3 Nonetheless, defendants
argued that the student/plaintiffs were never exposed to any of the
counseling and any future exposure was based purely upon random
selection. 1 4 The court found that the plaintiffs had alleged
sufficient "threatened" injury in this case because their children
were compelled by law to attend the school and were aware or
observed conduct to which they disagreed. 35 Moreover, the
chances that one of the "Doe" children might be selected for
participation in the program is real, and not remote odds like a
"lightning strike or a lottery win."'3 Thus, the fact that the plaintiffs
were never selected for the counseling was immaterial according to
the court. 37 Furthermore, the fact that the plaintiffs were not
required to participate in the program even if they were selected
did not ameliorate the standing issue because to require the
schoolchildren to decline the counseling would label them as
"different."'138
G. Sixth Circuit
The case of Wiley v. Franklin,39 stayed the enjoining of the
teaching of Bible courses in Hamilton and Chatanooga County
public schools for 45 days, including curriculum teaching the Ten
Commandments, until the school boards revised the procedure for
selection of teachers and revised the curriculum to be more
"secular" in nature. 140 Here, the court found that plaintiff
schoolchildren and parents had standing as far as the
Establishment Clause issue was concerned.'4 ' The court based its
meager standing analysis totally on the Schempp case. In this case,
it was alleged that each of the minor children was a student in the
schools at issue and that they were directly and adversely affected
by the practices therein. 142 The court reasoned that these
allegations were sufficient under Schempp to establish standing.
43
133. Id. at 282 n.20.
134. Id. at 283.
135. Doe, 173 F 3d at 283.
136. Id. at 283-84.
137. Id. at 284.
138. Id. at 284-85.
139. 468 F Supp. 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
140. Wiley, 468 F. Supp. at 152.
141. Id. at 146-47.
142. Id. at 146.
143. Id. at 146-47 (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9). The court allowed standing to
a minor child although the school she now attended did not offer the curriculum, because
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In Hawley v. City of Cleveland,'" the circuit court reversed the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' suit, which was based on lack
of standing. In this case, plaintiffs sued the city over its agreement
to lease space in the airport to the Catholic Diocese of Cleveland.'
45
The court interpreted Valley Forge very narrowly. First, the court
began its analysis by stating that a litigant must have "such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant
[the] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise
of the court's remedial powers on [their] behalf."146 Moreover, the
court stated that it was necessary that the plaintiff "has shown an
injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision." 147 Addressing the personal stake aspect, the court noted
that Appellants alleged that they regularly used the airport and that
the presence of the chapel in the airport "impairs [their] use and
enjoyment of the public facility."' 48
Next, the court noted that in Valley Forge, the plaintiffs failed "to
identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of
the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological
consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with
which one disagrees."'4 9 In addition, the court emphasized that it
was because the plaintiffs in Valley Forge did not allege an "injury
of any kind" that they lacked standing. 1° The court then premised
its reasoning as to why Valley Forge's non-economic injury analysis
was not a bar in this case by relying on two early 1970s cases:
Sierra Club v. Morton;'5 1 and SCRAP. The court stated that the
plaintiff in Sierra that was denied standing relied upon its status as
a "representative of the public," whereas the plaintiffs in SCRAP
had standing because they "challenged a proposed railroad freight
hike alleging that the increase would discourage recycling of
disposable cans and bottles and therefore damage Washington area
national parks which they used."152 Then, the court relied upon
when the suit was filed, the course was offered at her school. The court also stated that the
parents had standing to assert their individual rights as parents whose children attend
schools engaged in the complained of practices. Id. at 147.
144. 773 F.2d 736 (6th Cir. 1985).
145. Hawley, 773 F2d at 738.
146. Id. (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99).
147. Id. at 739 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485).
150. Hawley, 773 F2d at 739 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486).
151. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
152. Id. at 739-40 (quoting Sierra, 405 U.S. at 735-36 n.8; SCRAP citation omitted).
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ACLU v. Rabun County'53 for the "proposition that a plaintiff
challenging sectarian use of public property for impairing his actual
use and enjoyment of that property has standing to challenge the
impermissible activity."'14 The court distinguished Valley Forge
because in Valley Forge, plaintiffs did not reside in the state where
the transaction took place, whereas in Hawley, plaintiffs regularly
used the airport and "[elven if they can avoid the chapel area by
utilizing different concourses or stairways, this impingement on
their right to use the airport is sufficient to confer standing since it
would 'force them to assume special burdens' to avoid 'unwelcome
religious exercises.' "55
In Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public School Board,'6 the court,
relying upon its interpretation of the standing doctrine, found that
the case was not moot.57 In this case, plaintiff challenged a portrait
of Jesus Christ that had hung in the hallway of the high school he
had attended, but since graduated from while the case was pending
appeal. Here, the court cited Hawley'58 with approval and noted
that the plaintiff's graduation did not end the case because it still
affects his use of the school and potentially affects any member of
the public who attends an event at the school. 5 9 The court
acknowledged conflict in the standing cases. Nonetheless, it
misconstrued Valley Forge to mean that psychological harm alone
is not always sufficient to confer standing when contact is indirect,
while Harvey (see infra) stated that "unwelcome direct contact
with the offensive object is enough."16° Moreover, the court stated
that the "use of governmental authority to encourage a sectarian
religious view is a sufficient injury if directed toward the
plaintiff."16' Remarkably, the court opined, "any parent, employee or
former student who uses the school facilities and suffers actual
153. 698 F2d 1098 (l1th Cir. 1983).
154. Hawley, 773 F2d at 740.
155. Id. (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.22). Contrast this proposition with
Zielke infra, in which the court held that the fact that plaintiffs did not alter their conduct,
although they could have, does not confer standing because there is no injury. In addition,
the court quoted Valley Forge out of context. The language quoted was discussing the
difference between captive schoolchildren in Schempp and the Valley Forge plaintiffs.
156. 33. F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994).
157. The court stated that "[mlootness is 'the doctrine of standing set in a time
frame.'" Washegesic, 33 F3d at 682 (quoting United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445
U.S. 388, 397 (1980)).
158. The court also cited Rabun with approval.
159. Washegesic, 33 E3d at 682.




injury would have standing to sue."162
The court, in Ganulin v. United States,'6 went so far as to
presume certain facts in order to find standing for a plaintiff who
challenged that Christmas Day is an unconstitutional establishment
of religion. In Ganulin, the court began its standing analysis by
repeating the three elements of Lujan.1' Despite the Supreme
Court's unequivocal language in Valley Forge that there is no sliding
scale of standing for Establishment Clause claims, the court in
Ganulin noted that the Sixth Circuit has held that First
Amendment plaintiffs do not bear a heavy burden.'6 Thus,
following the circuit court in Suhre, the court stated that standing
for establishment clause cases can be tailored to reflect the type of
injury those classes of plaintiffs are likely to suffer.'6 Next, the
court in a completely illogical statement noted that although
"[p]laintiffs must allege more than an abstract injury, [an] actual
injury to individual values of an abstract or esoteric nature can
provide the basis for standing."167 The court correctly stated that
standing cannot be found on the assumption that if the plaintiff
lacked standing, no one would be found to have standing.'6
Moreover, the court also correctly noted that the Supreme Court
has held that a claim of harm in the proper application of the
Constitution that no more directly benefits the plaintiff than it does
the public at large lacks standing.tm In addition, the court
recognized that Valley Forge found that plaintiffs lacked standing
because they "failed to identify any personal injury suffered by
them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other
than the psychological consequence presumably produced by
162. Id. at 683. This court goes well beyond what even the Schempp court envisioned
for the requirement of standing. Whereas in Sckempp, the potential plaintiff is a captive
audience, here, the potential plaintiff is anyone who could theoretically walk through the
school and simply complain that he/she feels that the school has engaged in an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. In a sarcastic "concurrence," Senior Circuit Judge
Guy remarked that the portrait had hung on the school wall for 30 years and that a
discussion of "'psychological damage' resulting from viewing this picture does implicate an
'establishment' -. .. not one of religion . . [but] a class of 'eggshell' plaintiffs of a delicacy
never before known to the law." Id. at 684. Moreover, he noted that the portrait "no more
conveys the notion of the 'establishment' of a religion than a statue of Robert E. Lee in a
park suggests that we should dissolve the Union." Id.
163. 71 F Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
164. Ganutin, 71 F Supp. 2d at 827.
165. Id. at 828.
166. Id. (citing Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1086).
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489).
169. Ganulin, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 828 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-74).
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observation of conduct with which one disagrees."170
Nevertheless, the district court stated that direct, personal contact
with a religious display was considered a sufficient personal injury
under Suhre and the Sixth Circuit case of Washegesic.'
7'
In a case involving a display of the Ten Commandments at a
public school, Doe v. Harlan County School District,1' 2 the district
court held that the individual plaintiffs met the standing
requirements because the plaintiff student must attend her middle
school. 73 Here, the court stated that the plaintiffs have suffered,
and are under the threat of suffering, concrete injuries sufficient to
confer standing. 74 The court noted that plaintiffs in Harlan County
have more regular contact with the "offensive" materials than those
of Washegesic.175 Furthermore, the court stated that unlike the
Seventh Circuit case of Gonzales v. North Township of Lake
County, Ind.,176 it would have been highly impractical for the
plaintiffs to have altered their normal routines, thus direct contact
by their virtue of attendance at school sufficed for finding
standing.17
Likewise, in ACLU v. McCreary County,7 8 and ACLU v. Pulaski
County,179 the Eastern District Court of Kentucky found that
plaintiffs had standing to challenge modified Ten Commandment
170. Id. (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 830. Among other allegations, the plaintiff in this case alleged that the
practice "makes Plaintiff feel like an outsider and not an integral part of the political
community in the United States." Id. at 829. Here, the district court noted that this allegation
sounds like a claim of psychological harm, insufficient to confer standing under Valley Forge.
Id. at 830. The court also noted that if the plaintiff only "seeks to gain a sense of personal
satisfaction in seeing that the Constitution is upheld, then he lacks standing." Id. (citing Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)) (holding that psychic satisfaction is
not a sufficient Article I remedy to confer standing). Nevertheless, the court noted that the
plaintiff likened his case to that of Suhre and Washegesic, however, the plaintiff was unable
to explain just what ldnd of contact he was exposed to, so, sua sponte, the court
presumed that the direct contact of the plaintiff would be the closing of federal buildings,
courts, etc., for reasons religious in nature. Id. (emphasis added). Stating that it was a close
call, the court held that plaintiff had standing because it could not conclude that the plaintiff
"could prove no set of facts in support of his assertion of standing." Id.
172. 96 F Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
173. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F Supp. 2d at 670. Although the court cites no
authority for conferring standing on this basis, it is obvious that the facts in this case
resembled those of Schempp.
174. Id. at 669 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (stating that abstract or
hypothetical injuries are insufficient to confer standing on a party)).
175. Id. at 670.
176. 4 F3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993).
177. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d at 670.
178. 96 F Supp. 2d 679 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
179. 96 F Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
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displays, set in high traffic areas of their respective courthouses,
for the same reasons (and with almost identical language) as the
court in Harlan County School District. In these cases, the court
stated that it would be highly impractical for the plaintiffs to alter
their routine because they must enter the courthouse to conduct
civic business.180 Furthermore, the court found that the ACLU had
organizational standing because as long as the association "alleges
that its members ... are suffering immediate or threatened injury
as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out
a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit" it is a
proper party to bring suit.81
Finally, in Adland v. Russ,82 the district court found that
plaintiffs had standing to challenge a resolution by the governor of
Kentucky that mandated relocation of a Ten Commandments
monument, displayed on the Capitol grounds, to a permanent site
on the Capitol grounds near Kentucky's floral clock.'83 Here, the
court accepted the affidavits of the plaintiffs that indicated that
they would "travel to the State Capitol frequently, and will endure
direct and unwelcomed contact with the monument once it is
relocated."184 In addition, the ACLU's 1,800 statewide members who
frequently travel to the Capitol would have this contact as well.
1'
Here, the court merely relied on the case of Washegesic to confer
standing on the plaintiffs.'86
H. Seventh Circuit
In the case of ACLU v. City of St. Charles,'87 the court held that
plaintiffs had standing to enjoin a display of a lighted cross on top
of the city's fire department building aerial.18 The court first noted
that the ACLU's organizational standing depended entirely upon its
members, as it did not allege any injury to itself.1 Here, municipal
taxpayer standing was not an issue because it was agreed that any
180. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 682-83. Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
181. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 683 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver.
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)). Pulaski County, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (quoting Hunt v. Wash.
State Apple Adver. Cornn'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)).
182. 107 F Supp. 2d 782 (E.D. Ky. 2000).
183. Adand, 107 F Supp. 2d at 784-85.
184. Id. at 784.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
188. City of St. Charles, 794 F2d at 268-69.
189. Id. at 267.
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funds used to supply the electricity to the cross were de minimis.19
Next, the court stated that the fact that the plaintiffs did not like
the cross being displayed on public property, or that they are
offended by such, does not confer standing.' 91 Thus, to be made
"indignant by knowing that government is doing something of
which one violently disapproves is not the kind of injury that can
support a federal suit."92 Nevertheless, the court remarked that it
should make a difference if the plaintiff is complaining about an
establishment of religion in his own city, town or state because
that person may be intensely distressed. 1 However, avoiding the
question of "degrees of distress," the court explained that the
plaintiffs were distressed enough to alter their behavior to avoid
seeing the cross and even though that action is a slight cost, it is
enough to distinguish them from other objectors to the display.'
94
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs inflicted this cost upon
themselves and could avoid the cost altogether by continuing to
follow their usual routes and ignore the cross' presence. 95 The
court answered by pointing to the Schempp case that held that
although plaintiffs could have avoided the Bible reading and Lord's
Prayer by placing their children in private secular schools, they did
not need to in order to establish standing.'9 At this juncture, the
court totally misread the difference between Schempp and Valley
Forge. The court stated that the injury in Schempp was due to the
involuntary audience and that if those plaintiffs would not have
standing, there would be no judicial remedy against establishments
of religion that did not depend on taxpayer money. 97 Finally, the
Seventh Circuit stated that to control the amount of litigation and
190. Id. at 267-68.
191. Id. at 268 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-87).
192. Id. (citing People Organized for Welfare & Employment Rights v. Thompson, 727
E2d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1984)).
193. City of St. Charles, 794 E2d at 268. How this proposition is reconcilable with the
court's preceding statements or Valley Forge is not stated as Judge Posner offers no




197. Id. To the contrary, the Court in Valley Forge explicitly stated that the plaintiffs in
Schempp "had standing, not because their complaint rested on the Establishment Clause...
but because impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises
or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22
(emphasis added). Furthermore, in completely unambiguous language, the Court in Valley
Forge held that "[t]he assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would




steer it towards the people most affected allows a suit by the
citizens of St. Charles "rather than by residents of Pasadena who
read about the St. Charles cross in the Los Angeles Times - the
rules of standing confine the right to sue to persons who can show
something akin to a common law injury, that is, an injury to person
or property." 98 Here, the court stated that the injury was the free
use of the city's streets and sidewalks.' 99
Approximately two years later, in Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. Zielke,200 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a display of
a Ten Commandments monument located in a city park because
they:
1) failed to allege a distinct and palpable injury resulting from
the allegedly unconstitutional action of the City of La Crosse;
2) did not establish that Grams was a municipal taxpayer or
that the city had used tax money to erect or maintain the
monument; 3) failed to establish standing on the basis of mere
proximity to the challenged action; and 4) did not meet the
requirements of representational standing for the
Foundation.2 0'
In this case, the monument at issue was approx. 5' 4" high x 33"
wide and 10" deep.2°2 The monument is located eight feet from the
sidewalk that surrounds the park, is clearly visible from the
sidewalk, and is lighted from the roof of the Eagles building across
the street from the park.203 The city owns and maintains the park,
but did not buy, nor expend funds on the maintenance of the
monument.20 Grams, a resident of La Crosse, found out about the
monument through a friend and went to see it for herself.205 She
testified that she was "offended by the display because she viewed
it as a message from the city about the religious beliefs that private
citizens should hold."206 She complained to the Common Council
198. City of St. Chartes, 794 F2d at 274-75.
199. Id. at 275. How the plaintiffs free use of the streets and sidewalks was hindered
by the cross other than by psychological harm if they were to continue using them is not
explained. The court's holding flies in the face of Valley Forge and is circular.
200. 845 F2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988).
201. Zielke, 845 F2d at 1470.




206. Zielke, 845 F2d at 1466.
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and, after no action was taken, filed an action in the district court
alleging that the monument was a governmental endorsement and
establishment of religion that violated the first and fourteenth
amendments to the constitution.
20 7
The court noted that the appellants had to be able to establish
some type of direct and palpable injury, even a minor one, as a
result of the monument.208 Here, the Seventh Circuit found that
although the appellants alleged that the display was a rebuke to
their religious beliefs and that they are offended by it, they did
not allege that they had altered their behavior because of the
monument.2°9 As a result, the court correctly noted that Valley
Forge held that "psychological harm" that one may suffer from
observing governmental conduct that he or she feels is disagreeable
is insufficient to establish standing. 210 Moreover, the court noted
that courts should refrain from "adjudicating 'abstract questions of
wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances'
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
representative branches."2" The court stated that had the appellants
refused to go to Cameron Park because of the monument, this
would have been a distinct and palpable injury because their right
to use a public park would have been adversely affected by the
display.212 However, appellants "affirmatively testified that they have
not been deprived of the use or enjoyment of Cameron Park
[because] ... they have not altered their behavior in any fashion or
suffered any detriment other than mere psychological
discomfort."2 13 Following the court in City of St. Charles, the court
considered appellants claim that she should have standing because
of her close proximity to the monument.214 Finally, the appellants
also failed to satisfy two of the criteria for establishing municipal
taxpayer standing: "First, the appellants failed to allege or prove
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1467.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1467 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86; see also City of St. Charles, 794
F2d at 268) (emphasis added).
211. Zielke, 845 F2d at1468 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475).
212. Id. at 1468 n.3.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1468-69. This proposition is taken from the proximity of the plaintiffs in
Valley Forge to the challenged property transfer. However, had the plaintiffs lived in the
region of Valley Forge there is no indication from the case that that fact would have made a
difference in the Court's reasoning and should not be taken as implying that the distance in
which one lives from an allegedly unconstitutional display makes an otherwise non-injury, an
injury. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.23.
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that Grams actually is a La Crosse municipal taxpayer. Second,
even if we presume that Grams is a taxpayer, the appellants did
not establish that the City of La Crosse has used tax revenues on
the allegedly unconstitutional display in Cameron Park. 215 The fact
that the City had spent $6,000 in 1899 to purchase the land for the
park was inconsequential as the challenged unconstitutional activity
is the monument, not the park, and, in this case, it was conceded
that no tax money had been spent on the monument.
216
The court in Harris v. City of Zion,217 found that plaintiffs had
standing to challenge religious imagery on a municipal seal. In this
consolidated case, two seals were at issue: (1) Rolling Meadows
contained a Latin Cross in the upper right quadrant of the seal; and
(2) Zion, had "God Reigns" at the top of the seal and a Latin Cross
on the left part of the seal.218 Plaintiffs alleged that several direct
burdens were imposed upon them by the presence of these seals.
219
Kuhn, plaintiff in the Rolling Meadows case, stated that he was
injured because he had to display the seal, which is on the
municipality's vehicle tax sticker, on the windshield of his
automobile, he had to dispose of garbage in bags that display the
seal, and he attempted to avoid any visual contact with the seal by
utilizing alternative travel routes.220 Harris, plaintiff in the Zion
case, alleged similar types of "injury." In addition, Harris
specifically stated that he avoided the particular route that brought
him within visual contact of Zion's water tower, which exhibited
the seal.
221
Here, the majority recognized that an injury-in-fact does not
include simple indignation or offense as a basis for standing. 
2
Nonetheless, the court found that although the injuries claimed
were little more than "identifiable trifles," it was "the willingness of
the plaintiffs to incur a tangible, albeit small cost that validates the
existence of genuine distress and warrants the invocation of federal
jurisdiction."223 In Harris, the court stated that for purposes of
standing, "it was not necessary to consider whether the plaintiffs
could prove the injury, it was enough that they pled good-faith
215. Id. at 1470.
216. Id.
217. 927 F2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991).
218. Harris, 927 F2d 1402, 1404.




223. Harris, 927 E2d at 1406 (citing St. Charles, 794 E2d at 268).
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allegations of damage. " 224 The majority and dissent in this case
were at odds over the correct interpretation of Lujan. The majority
relied upon what Lujan did not say, i.e., after the Lujan court
looked at the allegations in the complaint, it searched the affidavits
for any saving support; however, the Lujan court did not say that if
the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint had correctly
identified the "agency action," that would not have been sufficient
to confer standing.225 Nevertheless, the majority noted that the
defendant cities had failed to challenge the factual allegations of
injury in the plaintiffs' affidavits and as a result, waived any claim
that Kuhn's or Harris' allegations of injury presented a triable
issue.226 Moreover, unlike the creche cases, the seal here is
displayed year-round all over the city and not just for a few weeks
in one place.227 Notably, the majority expressed its approval of the
224. Id. (citing St. Charles, 794 F2d at 269). Judge Easterbrook took the majority to
task for this assertion and distinguished St. Charles because, in that case, plaintiff's detour
was conceded, whereas here, defendant cities have not conceded that plaintiffs "rearranged
their daily routines to avoid exposure to religious symbols." Id. at 1420 (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting). In fact, Harris moved to Zion after being recruited by the "Society" as a potential
plaintiff to lend his name to the litigation. Id. Thus, the cost to Harris was what it cost him
to expose himself to the seal. Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook noted that in St. Charles, it
was recognized that "the plaintiff could not prevail without proving the 'detour' allegations of
the complaint." Id. To allow standing on mere allegations would permit parties to obtain
jurisdiction by consent and would foster collusive litigation. Id. (see 28 U.S.C. § 1359 and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)) (noting that courts do examine the jurisdictional allegations of the
complaint).
225. Id. at 1406-07 (citing Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-93). The majority, in a footnote,
stated that even if the dissent's interpretation of Lujan was correct, the instant cases are
distinguishable because they are Establishment Clause cases and not review of an
administrative action. Id. at 1407 n.5. What Lujan actually says is:
The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [the standing]
elements. Since they are not merely pleading requirements but rather an indispensable
part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any
other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner
and degree of evidence required at successive stages of the litigation. At the pleading
stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may
suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we "presume that general allegations embrace
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." In response to a
summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such "mere
allegations," but must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence "specific facts," which
for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the
final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be "supported adequately by the
evidence adduced at trial."
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted). Thus, at each stage of the litigation plaintiff bears
the respective burden of proof to maintain standing. In addition, the court in Lujan stated
that this rule is not limited to administrative agency actions, but "[wihen the suit is one
challenging the legality of government action or inaction". Id.
226. Harris, 927 F.2d at 1407-08.
227. Id. at 1408-09.
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Zielke case because the Zielke plaintiffs "never argued that they
changed their behavior."228 Regrettably, the court perpetuated the
error of St. Charles through the proposition that if Kuhn and Harris
cannot sue to test the constitutionality of a religious symbol, no
one would be able to sue.
229
In Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County,2 the court
found that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the display of a
crucifix in a public park. Here, the crucifix was 16 feet tall, sat on
a base two feet tall, and was donated to the Township in 1955 by
the Knights of Columbus as a war memorial. 23' Three of the
plaintiffs alleged that the presence of the crucifix in the Park
infringed on their use and enjoyment of the park and offended their
moral and religious sensitivities. The other plaintiff, a former Park
employee, quit his job after the cross was erected and had gone to
the park only three times since leaving.232 Plaintiffs were unable to
establish taxpayer standing because no government money was
used to buy the crucifix, no government funds were used to
maintain the crucifix, and whatever funds were expended in
maintaining the Park area surrounding the crucifix would have
been spent regardless of the presence of the crucifix.m
The court began its analysis by stating that only a plaintiff with a
personal stake, which a plaintiff can establish only if the plaintiff
has suffered an injury-in-fact in the case or controversy, has
standing.2m Here, the court correctly noted that at the summary
judgment stage, the plaintiff must produce affidavits or documents
that support his injury allegation.235 The court, citing Harris, noted
that offense to religious and moral sensitivities is insufficient to
confer standing because there must be "a tangible, albeit small cost
that validates the existence of genuine distress."23 Next, the court
stated, "an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a
228. Id. at 1409.
229. Id. Judge Easterbrook correctly cited Valley Forge and Schlesinger in pointing out
the majority's error. Id. at 1422 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
230. 4 F.3d 1412 (7th Cir. 1993).
231. Gonzales, 4 F3d at 1414. A plaque on the base of the crucifix designated the
crucifix as a war memorial but the plaque was discovered missing in 1983 and had never
been replaced. Id.
232. Id. at 1416. The latter plaintiff, the district court held, had standing; however, that
court dismissed the other plaintiffs. Id. The court of appeals reversed as to the other
plaintiffs and it is their claims that the court mainly addresses here.
233. Id. at 1416.
234. Id. at 1415.
235. Id. at 1415-16 (citing SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689).
236. Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1416 (quoting Harris, 927 F2d at 1406).
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question of principle".2 7 Thus, the court noted that plaintiffs
needed to produce some evidence to support their alleged "use and
enjoyment" injury. Here, the court opined that this case was like
SCRAP because "plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of a national park
was curtailed, not denied, by defendant's actions which was
sufficient to confer standing."m Therefore, the court held that the
prohibition to the plaintiffs of their full use and enjoyment of the
Park was an injury in fact.2
237. Id. (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14). It should be noted at this juncture,
what the court in SCRAP actually stated. The district court had decided that case at the
preliminary injunction stage and only had before it the pleadings. Commenting on standing at
the pleading stage the Supreme Court stated that:
[PIleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable. A plaintiff must allege that he has been or will in fact be perceptibly
harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in
which he could be affected by the agency's action. And it is equally clear that the
allegations must be true and capable of proof at trial. But we deal here simply with
the pleadings in which the appellees alleged a specific and perceptible harm that
distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that
were claimed to be affected.
SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89. In the ensuing footnote the Court stated that: "'Injury in fact'
reflects the statutory requirement that a person be 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved,' and it
serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation -even
though small -from a person with a mere interest in the problem." Id. at 689 n. 14. It
appears as though courts regularly misapply SCRAP's meaning to allow standing no matter
how slight the alleged injury and its use seems to have led to the "sliding scale" of standing
that courts invoke in Establishment Clause claims. Thus, the "identifiable trifle" must still be
a sufficient injury to confer standing and, in Establishment Clause cases, the Court in Valley
Forge has delineated what does not suffice as a trifle. Even given the fact that someone
purports to alter his behavior because of a religious display, does that still not stem from the
fact that he finds the display offensive or unconstitutional and that that person suffers only
because of his sensibilities? Whereas if 100 other people that walk by the display pay it no
heed, meaning that 101 people had been exposed to the same "governmental action," and
only one claims an injury, how can that one person actually allege that he has been exposed
or harmed in a manner different than the 100 that claim no harm unless it is only because of
his sensitivities which is clearly insufficient to confer standing under Valley Forge?
238. Gonzales, 4 F3d at 1416-17. Comparing the "use and enjoyment" of an area that
could possibly be devastated by the taldng of greater natural resources from that area, and
the "use and enjoyment" of a Park because of the presence of a religious statue, is
comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. In the former situation, those people who used
that area would be injured regardless of their sensibilities, in the latter situation, there is no
injury to anyone by virtue of the statue, only offended feelings of "eggshell" plaintiffs which
is insufficient under Valley Forge to confer standing.
239. Id. at 1417. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit granted standing to a plaintiff who was
denied access to a beer tent for an hour at an Italian Festival sponsored by the Village of
Crestwood because of a Roman Catholic Mass that was to be conducted during that time.
Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 917 F2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990). It could be argued, however, that
in that case, the plaintiff was actually denied access to the facility. In the instant case, how
did the government deny plaintiffs access to the Park? It is open to all, unless I suppose
one's sensitivities are offended, which, again, is insufficient under Valley Forge to grant
standing.
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The district court in Doe v. County of Montgomery,240 held that
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge a sign over the main
entrance of the Montgomery County Courthouse that contained the
words "THE WORLD NEEDS GOD." The sign at issue in this case
was approximately 10 feet long by 1 1/2 feet tall with the words
approximately 1 foot tall. This sign had been over the entrance
since 1936.241 Of note, this courthouse has several entrances, but
the sign at issue was placed over the "main, most prominent
entrance."24 In this case, two of the plaintiffs alleged that they
were Montgomery County residents. Both objected to the County's
sponsorship of the religious message and alleged that they wished
to avoid the sign, but must come in to contact with it to participate
fully as Montgomery County citizens.2" Doe alleged that she had
been involved in civil and criminal cases and may again be in the
future, she is subject to jury duty, and must enter the courthouse
to visit the State Attorney, County Clerk, County Treasurer, and
Sheriff as well as attend meetings of the County Board.
Consequently, "she must come into direct, unwelcome contact with
the sign."2" Roe claimed that he has been called for jury duty and
may again be in the future, he had registered to vote at the
courthouse as well as obtained absentee ballots there, and must
enter for the other reasons stated by Doe.245 Plaintiff Stein alleged
that he was an attorney who lived in Cook County, Illinois,
objected to the display, and refused to represent clients whose
cases would be heard in Montgomery County. He also alleged that
he may have to visit the courthouse in the future to visit the offices
of other government officials and will be "deterred from doing so
because of the presence of the sign."
2"
The district court began its analysis by referencing the elements
of standing found in the Valley Forge opinion. The court also noted
that to allege a non-economic injury, one must be "directly affected
by the laws and practices against which their complaints are
directed."247 The court also recognized that Valley Forge narrowed
the scope of Schempp by stating that the plaintiffs in Schempp had
240. 848 F. Supp. 832 (C.D. IMI. 1994).
241. County of Montgomery, 848 F. Supp. at 832-33.




246. County of Montgomery, 848 F Supp. at 833.
247. Id. at 834 (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9).
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standing not because of any "spiritual stake" grounded in the
establishment clause, but "because impressionable schoolchildren
were subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to
assume special burdens to avoid them."m Furthermore, the court
stated that the Seventh Circuit had yet to grant standing based on
"unwelcome religious exercises" unless the plaintiff has assumed
"special burdens to avoid them."249 Thus, a plaintiff must alter her
behavior to have standing.25 Here, the court stated that "Plaintiffs
have not pled or otherwise indicated that they have been forced to
assume any special burden or altered their behavior because of the
sign."25' For example, Doe and Roe stated that they wished to avoid
the sign, but neither had altered their behavior because of it and
psychological harm alone from looking at the sign is insufficient to
confer standing.252 Likewise, Plaintiff Stein had given no indication
that he ever refused to represent a client because of the sign;
therefore, the court found that his "injury" was abstract,
conjectural, and hypothetical rather than one that is distinct and
palpable.25 Finally, the court held that although the plaintiffs may
have been compelled to look upon the sign, they lacked standing
"unless they assume[d] some burden to avoid contact [with] the
alleged offensive sign."
25
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.255 The
circuit court began its analysis by citing the first two elements of
Lujan, i.e., "injury-in-fact" and "actual or imminent" and reiterated
Valley Forge's finding that "psychological harm" alone is insufficient
to confer standing.25 Next the court invoked SCRAP and asserted
248. Id. (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 835 (citing Harris, 927 F2d at 1405; Freedom From Religion Found. v.
Zielke, 845 F 2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988); ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F2d 265 (7th Cir.
1986); and Gonzales, 4 F.3d at 1416). The court noted that other circuits have construed
Vaey Forge to find standing solely on direct personal contact with the offensive action. Id.
251. County of Montgomery, 848 F Supp. at 835.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 836.
255. Doe v. County of Montgomery, 41 F3d 1156 (1994).
256. County of Montgomery, 41 F3d at 1159. Unfortunately, the court here takes
liberty with a footnote in Valley Forge and stated that a "plaintiff" who is subjected to
unwelcome religious exercises or forced to assume special burdens to avoid them has
demonstrated an injury-in-fact. Id. The footnote actually stated that the plaintiffs in Schempp
had standing because "impressionable schoolchildren were subjected to unwelcome religious
exercises." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22. The Seventh Circuit disregards this distinction
made by the Supreme Court by stating that "Article III does not differentiate between
'impressionable schoolchildren' and other classes of plaintiffs". County of Montgomery, 41
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that an "identifiable trifle" is enough to confer standing.257 In
addition, the court cited several Supreme Court cases in which
plaintiffs were deemed to have standing to litigate their claims.m
However, four of those cases involved "impressionable
schoolchildren." The plaintiffs in Lynch were granted standing
based on their status as taxpayers, and the standing issue was not
even litigated in County of Allegheny.259 Furthermore, the court
stated that "altered behavior" or "special burdens" are merely
factors in determining whether to grant standing and are not
controlling.26° Thus, the circuit court distinguished Zielke by stating
that the plaintiffs in that case failed to demonstrate that they were
exposed to the monument during their normal routines or in the
course of their usual driving or walking routes, whereas here, Doe
and Roe allege that they must come into direct and unwelcome
contact with the sign to participate in local government and fulfill
their legal obligations. 261 Nevertheless, the court did affirm denial of
F.3d at 1160 n.2. The court totally overlooks the fact that Valley Forge was referring to the
type of injury and not the class of plaintiffs, i.e., the Supreme Court in Valley Forge
recognized that there may be actual harm to impressionable schoolchildren who are
subjected to unwelcome "religious exercises" but not harm to plaintiffs who merely observe
what they perceive to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. These two situations are
entirely different; therefore, to lump them together or even opine that a "sign" is a "religious
exercise" is indeed reading into the standing doctrine a license to hammer out political
differences by way of the judiciary.
257. County of Montgomery, 41 F3d at 1159 (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14). See
note 234 supra discussing the "identifiable trifle" of SCRAP.
258. Id. The Seventh Circuit invoked four cases dealing with public school exercises,
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Schempp, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), and
Stone, and the two creche cases, Lynch and County of Allegheny. Doe, 41 F3d at 1159-60.
259. Although the Seventh Circuit opined that there was no difference between
"impressionable schoolchildren" and "other classes of plaintiffs," in order to support its
reasoning, the court is reduced to citing high Court cases that involved "impressionable
schoolchildren." Id. at 1161. In addition, the court stated that even though the issue was not
litigated in County of Allegheny the fact that the Court heard the case, it reasoned, was
tantamount to approval of conferring standing on plaintiffs that are "subjected to unwelcome
religious exercises." Id. This statement is preposterous as there is no basis for the premise
that if a court allows a plaintiff standing in a particular type of case then any plaintiff has
standing that brings that same type of case. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95.
260. County of Montgomery, 41 F3d at 1160-61.
261. Id. at 1161 (citing Zielke, 845 E2d at 1468-69). At this juncture, the court simply
misquoted the facts of Zielke. In Zielke, the plaintiffs alleged that they have suffered a
.rebuke to [their] religious beliefs respecting religion by virtue of being subjected to a
governmental endorsement of unequivocally religious precepts and confusions."
Zielke, 845 F.2d at 1468 (emphasis added). Thus, the court in Zielke found that the fact that
plaintiffs were subjected to the cross in the park was not sufficient to confer standing
because the plaintiffs did not alter their behavior and could not demonstrate that their use
and enjoyment of the park was in any way diminished. Id.
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standing to plaintiff Stein.262
The latest case in the Seventh Circuit that addressed Article III
standing in a religious display situation was Books v. City of
Elkhart.263 Here, the district court granted standing to plaintiffs
who challenged the display of a Ten Commandments monument at
the city's municipal building.2 4 Once again, the court acknowledged
the "irreducible constitutional minimum" elements for standing:
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability.265 Furthermore, the
court acknowledged that merely observing behavior in which one
disagrees is also insufficient to confer standing.26 Next, the court
discussed the divergence that the Seventh Circuit took on the
standing doctrine by its holding in Doe.26 In addition, the court
dismissed the Seventh Circuit's reliance on the Supreme Court
cases discussed in Doe because they either dealt with some
measure of taxpayer standing or involved public school students
and their families.26 Nonetheless, the court held that even though
the plaintiffs in Books did not necessarily have to come into direct
and unwelcome contact with the Ten Commandments monument, it
granted standing based on the court's decision in Doe.269
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the district court's grant of
standing to plaintiffs and even broadened its standing application.
270
Judge Ripple noted that the district court rightly relied upon the
Doe decision in finding standing and reiterated its reliance upon the
Supreme Court cases that the district court found to be
distinguishable. 27' Thus, the court opined that although the plaintiffs
262. County of Montgomery, 41 F.3d at 1162.
263. 79 F Supp. 2d 979 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
264. Books, 79 F Supp. 2d at 988.
265. Id. at 986-87.
266. Id. at 987.
267. Id. at 987-88. The court in Doe relied upon a passage that discussed allegations
regarding the proximity of the plaintiff in Zielke to the "offensive" display. Plaintiff had
alleged that she lived close to the offending monument; however, the court found that she
did not live anywhere near the park and she did not demonstrate that "the monument is
visible in the course of her normal routine, or that her usual driving or walking routes take
her past the park." Id. (quoting Zielke, 845 F.2d at 1469). It should be noted that the court in
Zielke declined to state whether any of these allegations in and of themselves would have
been sufficient to confer standing.
268. Id. at 988. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
269. Books, 79 F Supp. 2d at 988. The Elkhart monument was 46 feet away from the
main entrance to the building whereas the sign in Doe was directly over the door. Both
plaintiffs in Books alleged that they saw the monument in the course of their daily activities,
yet both also admitted that they did not alter their routes because of the monument. Id.
270. Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000).
271. Books, 235 F3d at 299.
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could have altered their path into the municipal building to avoid
the monument, they were not obligated to do so to suffer an injury
in fact.272 Amazingly, the court stated that because the plaintiffs
were aware of the words that were written on the monument,
walking behind the monument would not eradicate the "injury."273
The court concluded that "a plaintiff may allege an injury in fact
when he is forced to view a religious object that he wishes to
avoid but is unable to avoid because of his right or duty to attend
the government-owned place where the object is located."
274
I. Ninth Circuit
In the case of Zwerling v. Reagan,275 plaintiffs challenged former
President Ronald Reagan's proclamation of the year 1983 as the
"Year of the Bible". Defendant Reagan moved for judgment on the
pleadings asserting that plaintiffs did not have standing.276 The
court noted that plaintiffs allegations were rhetoric that ignored a
requirement of Valley Forge that there be an "actual injury
redressable by the Court" because "[ilt tends to assure that the
legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the
rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences
of judicial action."277 Nonetheless, the court decided that plaintiffs
had no standing, not based on a "Valley Forge" analysis, but
because it did not consider the proclamation, or the Congressional
action authorizing the proclamation, a "law" respecting the
272. Id. at 300-01.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 301. Following this reasoning to its logical conclusion, a plaintiff, if aware of
a constitutionally objectionable religious display, would have standing to challenge the
display based solely on his right to pass by the object whether he intended to do so or not.
This is exactly the type of "injury" that was held to be insufficient in Valley Forge.
Theoretically, a plaintiff in Chicago could sue the government in Indianapolis if he was
aware of a religious display that he objected to solely on his right to visit that governmental
building.
275. 576 F Supp. 1373 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
276. Zwerling, 576 F Supp. at 1374. Plaintiffs asserted that they were harmed because:
(1) the non-Christians and atheists do not accept the Bible as the Word of God; (2)
non-Christians are singled out for disadvantageous treatment because of their minority
religious status; (3) non-Christian clergymen are disadvantaged by having the prestige
and power of the United States endorse the Christian Bible and undermine their
ability to provide religious, spiritual and atheist leadership; and (4) Christians have
their religious book used for political rather than religious purposes impeding their
efforts to promote and engage in beneficial ecumenical dialogue with non-Christians.
Id.
277. Id. at 1374-75 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).
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establishment of religion.278 Thus, the court ruled on the merits
under hypothetical jurisdiction.
27 9
In the case of Ellis v. City of La Mesa,2s8 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit held that each plaintiff had standing because
they: (1) avoided the Mt. Helix Nature Theatre because of a large
cross; (2) avoided going to a park because of the cross' dominance
of the hilltop; and (3) would have invited business guests to his
home but for the presence of the cross on the insignia. 281 The court
noted that to have standing, each plaintiff must "show that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant."28 2 Here, the
court followed Seventh and Eleventh circuit precedent that held
"when a plaintiff alleges that the government has unconstitutionally
aligned itself with religion, standing may be based on finding that
the plaintiff has been injured due to his or her not being able to
freely use public areas."283 Thus, the court determined that a party
has standing if he "has been injured due to his or her not being
able to freely use public areas."28
Consequently, in Zichko v. Clegg,285 the court held that an Idaho
prisoner did not have standing to bring an Establishment Clause
claim based on his mere exposure to the county's Ten
Commandments monument. The court relied upon the holding in
Ellis and stated that a plaintiff must show that he has personally
"suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant."2  In this case, Zichko
failed to submit any evidence of injury that he received from
exposure, such as "complaining that the monument somehow
prevented him from freely using the courthouse, or requesting an
278. Id. at 1375.
279. The Supreme Court has recently held that the practice of invoking hypothetical
jurisdiction is not constitutional in the case of Steel Co. v. Citizens For A Better
Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
280. 990 F2d 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
281. Id. at 1523. At issue in this consolidation of three cases was a 36 foot cross atop
Mt. Helix in a county park, a 43-foot cross on the hilltop of Mt. Soledad in a city park, and a
depiction of the Mt. Helix cross on one of the City of La Mesa's official insignia. Id. at 1520.
282. Id. at 1523 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).
283. Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1564 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citing ACLU v.
City of St. Charles, 794 F2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986), and ACLU v. Rabun County, 698 F2d 1098
(11th Cir. 1983)).
284. Id. (quoting Hewitt, 940 F2d at 1564).
285. No. 97-16652, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27853 at *3-4 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998).
286. Zichko, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 27853 at *4 (quoting Ellis, 990 F.2d at 1523).
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alternate route to avoid exposure to the monument."2 7
Likewise, in Doe v. Madison School District No. 321,288 the court
held that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge graduation prayers
in the defendant's school district because her children had already
graduated from the schools and she did not allege that she planned
to attend another graduation ceremony in the future.289 Therefore,
the plaintiff did not "allege a direct injury resulting from her
inability to attend a public event."
290
J. Tenth Circuit
In Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp.,291 the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit held that plaintiffs had standing to bring suit
challenging a Ten Commandments monument. The court found that
"standing is clearly conferred by non-economic religious values
when the plaintiffs assert a litigable interest under the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Federal
Constitution."292 Therefore, the court held that "the plaintiffs have
standing based on their beliefs about religion to question whether
those beliefs have been infringed upon by an alleged use of public
property for religious purposes."
293
In Foremaster v. City of St. George,291 the court found that the
plaintiff had standing based on his complaint that the City's subsidy
of the exterior lighting of a Mormon temple caused him to suffer
economic injury in the form of higher utility rates. The court also
found that plaintiff had non-economic standing to challenge the
city's use of a logo depicting the local Mormon temple.295 The court
discussed Valley Forge's statement that plaintiffs in that case lacked
standing because they "fail[ed] to identify any personal injury
suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional
error, other than the psychological consequences presumably
287. Id.
288. 177 F3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 1999).
289. Madison Sch. Dist., 177 F3d at 797. The main crux of plaintiffs argument in this
case was her status as a taxpayer, which the court analyzed in detail, but, found that if the
plaintiff "identifies no public funds that were spent solely on the challenged activity, then the
plaintiff has not alleged a taxpayer injury." Id.
290. Id.
291. 475 F2d 29, 31 (10th Cir. 1973).
292. Anderson, 475 F.2d at 31.
293. Id. This case was decided nine years before Valley Forge.
294. 882 F2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989).
295. Foremaster, 882 F2d at 1490-91.
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produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees."296
Acknowledging that the circuits have interpreted this requirement
in different ways, the court relied upon the Sixth Circuit case of
Hawley discussed above. Thus, the court held that direct, personal
contact sufficed as non-economic injury.
29
In Arizona Civil Liberties Union v. Dunham,28 the court
addressed a standing question similar to the one faced by the Ninth
Circuit in Zwerling.29 In this case, the court vacated a previous
order dismissing the case for lack of standing on motion for
reconsideration. In an amazing about face, the court completely
skewed Supreme Court precedent on the standing issue in favor of
how other circuits have interpreted those cases in the
Establishment Clause context. The crux of the court's reversal of
itself in this case stems largely from its emphasis on the
"proximity" of plaintiffs to the challenged proclamation and
"whether the psychological injuries of plaintiffs . . .differed from
those experienced by the plaintiffs in Valley Forge".3°°
The court began its analysis like many of the other courts,
distinguishing between Schempp and Valley Forge.301 Probably the
296. Id. at 1490 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis in original)).
297. Id.
298. 112 F Supp. 2d 927 (D. Ariz. 2000).
299. See Zwerling for comments on the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction." But see
Reagan, supra (3d Cir.) (challenging presidential establishment of relations with the Holy
See dismissed for lack of standing for inability to allege an "injury-in-fact").
300. Dunham, 112 F Supp. 2d at 928. In Valley Forge, had the Dunham court bothered
to examine the case itself, it would have found the following: Respondent Americans United
claims that it has certain unidentified members who reside in Pennsylvania It does not
explain, however, how this fact establishes a cognizable injury where none existed
before. Respondent is still obligated to allege facts sufficient to establish that one or
more of its members has suffered, or is threatened with, an injury other than their
belief that the transfer violated the Constitution. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.23
(emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court did not base its decision on the proximity of
plaintiffs to the challenged action. To the contrary, the Court searched for evidence of an
injury other than psychological or constitutional differences that plaintiffs had with the
challenged conduct. Moreover, Valley Forge did not distinguish between varying levels of
psychological injury, rather, the Court unambiguously stated that "[plaintiffs) fail to identify
any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error,
other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of
conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing
under Art. I... ." Id. at 485 (emphasis added).
301. Dunham, 112 F Supp. 2d at 929. Two errors that the court made in this case was
its failure to recognize footnote 23 of Valley Forge (quoted in note 270 supra) that even if
the plaintiffs in Valley Forge lived in Pennsylvania, it would have made no difference in the
Court's decision, and that the plaintiffs in Schempp were "subjected to unwelcome religious
exercises". Id. In this case, the proclamation was not a religious exercise and the fact that
these plaintiffs suffered nothing else besides psychological injury is clearly insufficient to
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most glaring error that this court made in its standing analysis was
its reliance on the merits of Establishment Clause claims -in
Allegheny County and Lynch, instead of determining whether an
actual particularized injury had been suffered by one of the
plaintiffs.3  Next, the court relied upon the 1983 Eleventh Circuit
case of Rabun County that held that "standing exists if the
claimants were 'subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or
were forced to assume special burdens to avoid them.'"3 The
confer standing.
302. Id. Indeed, the court quotes Justice O'Connor's endorsement test rationale that
stated that when a government endorses a religion "[ilt sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community . . . ." Id. (quoting
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688). Thus, the circuit court analysis is circular: if one alleges that certain
governmental conduct makes him feel like a political outsider, it not only confers standing,
but it also goes towards the merits of an endorsement analysis. Thus, under this standing
"test," one need only allege an element of endorsement analysis in order to obtain standing,
regardless of whether the person actually suffered a "distinct and palpable injury to himself."
The Court flatly rejected this argument in Valley Forge and demands a showing of injured
plaintiffs instead. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489-90; see also the discussion in section 2 supra
and note 20. In fact, it may be argued that the only reason one may alter his behavior to
avoid contact with a religious display is because of a psychological or constitutional
difference one has with the display. After all, if two people walking side by side down the
street both witness the same display, what prompts one to avoid the display and not the
other unless it is a psychological or constitutional difference one may have that the other
does not have with the display? It cannot be realistically argued that an inanimate object by
itself can cause a distinct and palpable injury to one person and not another outside of some
other government conduct that distinguishes between the two individuals. Hence, what one
is left with is a generalized grievance, common to all members of society and better
addressed by the legislative branch of government instead of using the federal courts as
debating societies. Even in civil rights discrimination claims, one does not have standing to
bring a discrimination case just because one is a member of a protected class outside of
some injury personal to that person, e.g., if a black person from one state were denied
admission to a state university of another state based upon that person's race, another black
person that lived in the same city as the offending university would not have standing to
litigate a discrimination claim even though he was closer in proximity to the alleged
discriminatory conduct unless the university had directed its discriminatory conduct to that
person as well. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (denying standing to plaintiffs
who claimed that they were stigmatized by racial discrimination because none of the
plaintiffs could show that they had personally been denied equal treatment by the challenged
discriminatory conduct). Thus, proximity without injury is meaningless. By the same token, if
one were a resident of East McKeesport, PA and Allegheny County refused him services
because he was not a member of a particular religious faith, that person would have
standing to challenge the government's conduct as opposed to a person that lived closer to
the county seat who was not personally subject to the county's allegedly illegal conduct.
303. Id. (quoting Rabun County, 698 F2d at 1108 (quoting Valley Forge's discussion
distinguishing Schempp)). Again, a religious display involves no "religious exercise" nor does
it "force" anyone to do anything, one may look or not look as one wishes. Indeed, the
relevant definition of "force" is "[tlo compel through pressure or necessity." AM~mcAN
HERrrAGE DICrIoNARY 522 (2d college ed. 1982). "Th[is] verb[] means to make a person or
thing follow a prescribed or dictated course. Force, is broadly applicable to any such act and
usually implies the exertion of physical strength or the operation of circumstances that
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court then noted that the Ninth Circuit had adopted the
"avoidance" standard, however it recognized that it was
inapplicable to the case at hand because plaintiffs have not been
interfered with in their use of public property.304 The court found
that plaintiffs' injury in this case was analogous to the injury in
Saladin because plaintiffs were made to feel like "second class
citizens" by coming into direct contact with the Bible Week
Proclamation.m Indeed, the court held that only local residents
permit no alternative to compliance." Id. at 523. The keyword in the definition is "compel"
which, although "often interchangeable with force, stresses the power or strength of what
causes compliance and is especially applicable to an act dictated by a person in authority."
Id. Thus, a simple study of the English language reveals that an inanimate object is unable to
"force" or "compel" and, therefore, makes Schempp inapposite to the issue of standing in
religious display cases. Although it may be argued that a "stop sign" or "traffic lights" force
or compel people to take certain actions, the people directly affected by those inanimate
objects know that there is a "law" being enforced through them, whereas, with a religious
display, no law is being thrust upon the public. In addition, the court cited the case of
Saladin v. City of Miledgville, 812 F2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987) that also relied upon the
appellants allegations of endorsement, in order to find standing. This rationale was disposed
of in note 299 supra. Again, the injury alleged in Saladin was that the seal gave the plaintiff
"[t]he feeling of being a second class citizen." Saladin, 812 F2d at 692-93. How plaintiff's
hurt feelings are not a psychological injury is mysterious legal analysis.
304. Dunham, 112 F Supp. 2d at 930. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit has yet to
address the issue as to whether unwelcome direct contact with religious displays is sufficient
to confer standing. Id.
305. Id. at 932-33. See notes 272-74 supra. Moreover, the court in this case relied upon
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-55 (1984) as support for its proposition that the plaintiffs
suffered a particularized injury because they were made to feel like "outsiders" and not
merely an "abstract injury" insufficient for standing purposes. Dunham, 112 F Supp. 2d at
933. However, the Supreme Court in Allen was very explicit in its explanation of the
standing requirement in a racial discrimination equal protection case: Neither do they have
standing to litigate their claims based on the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial
discrimination. There can be no doubt that the sort of noneconomic injury is one of the
most serious consequences of discriminatory government action and is sufficient in some
circumstances to support standing. Our cases make clear, however, that such injury accords
a basis for standing only to "those persons who are personally denied equal treatment"
by the challenged discriminatory conduct. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (emphasis added). Thus, the
fact that the plaintiffs in Allen suffered a stigmatizing injury was insufficient to confer
standing without some particular discrinminatory government action directed to them
personally. Likewise, in religious display cases, the fact that a plaintiff belongs to a group
dedicated to the separation of church and state and is stigmatized or made to feel like an
outsider because of a religious display, that fact alone is insufficient to confer standing
without some governmental action directed personally toward that individual. If it were
otherwise, why make plaintiffs go through the motions and allege whatever is necessary to
confer standing, and, instead, just allow any plaintiff to bring an action against a religious
display merely because he is offended. Yet, this is exactly what the Court in Valley Forge
found to be insufficient for standing purposes in Establishment Clause cases. Furthermore,
the Alen Court opined:
If the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would extend nationwide to
all members of the particular racial groups against which the Government was alleged
to be discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
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"directly affected" by the town's action would have standing to
challenge the proclamation." Finally, the court held that if the
1997 Proclamation was declared unconstitutional, the Plaintiffs
were awarded nominal damages, and future Bible Week
proclamations of a similar nature are enjoined, the traceability and
redressability elements of standing are satisfied.
307
In the case of Schmidt v. Cline,3 the court recognized that
although Tenth Circuit precedent allows standing to plaintiffs who
allege a "direct, personal injury resulting from the challenged
[governmental] conduct," the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
the display of a poster that a county treasurer displayed in her
office that displayed the words "In God We Trust".301 The court
announced the irreducible minimum elements of standing and
noted that "standing may be predicated upon non-economic
injury."310 The court also recognized that a claim that the
Constitution has been violated does not confer standing. 31' In this
school, regardless of the location of that school. All such persons could claim the
same sort of abstract stigmatic injury respondents claim .... A black person in
Hawaii could challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
school in Maine. Recognition of standing in such circumstances would transform the
federal courts into "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of
concerned bystanders." Constitutional limits on the role of federal courts preclude
such a transformation.
Id. at 755-56 (citation omitted). Cf. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489-90 n.26 (stating that an
alleged violation of a "personal constitutional right" to a government that does not establish
religion is insufficient to confer standing upon an individual).
306. Dunham, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 935. The court's reasoning here is untenable as well.
If the stigmatic injury alleged by plaintiffs is sufficient to confer standing because they are
residents, why would not a person visiting the town of Dunham for a week not have
standing to bring an action against the town? Valley Forge and Allen both hold that it is not
proximity, but an injury suffered by a plaintiff as the result of government conduct directed
at a particular individual that satisfies the injury prong of standing. On the one hand, there
could be two people suffering the same stigmatic injury for the same length of time, ye,
under the Dunham court's reasoning, only one person would have standing based upon his
residency. On the other hand, if the visiting person were denied the services of the town
because he did not observe the proclamation issued by the town, that person should have
standing regardless of his residency because, in that instance, the person had suffered a
direct, palpable injury. Hence, it is not proximity that matters, but a real, personal injury.
307. Id.
308. 127 F Supp. 2d 1169 (D. Kan. 2000).
309. Schmidt, 127 F Supp. 2d at 1172, 1175 (citing Foremaster, 882 F2d at 1490-91).
310. Id. at 1172 (citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486).
311. Id. (citing Valley Forge, 454. U.S. at 485). Nonetheless, the court failed to
understand the Valley Forge Court's discussion of Schempp. In Schempp, the plaintiffs were
directly affected by the laws and practices of Abington Township School District because
they were subject to unwelcome "religious exercises" and had to assume special
burdens to avoid them, not because they came into direct contact with an inanimate
religious display.
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case, plaintiff Steams alleged no contact at all with the display,
only that she objected to the defendant's acts.312 Moreover, both
plaintiffs failed to allege that they continued to suffer any
emotional, psychological, spiritual, or other non-economic harm
from defendant's alleged acts.31 3 What the court did find decisive in
denying plaintiffs standing was that their assertions failed to
"demonstrate that they face a likelihood of future harm as a result
of defendant's conduct, as is necessary to warrant injunctive
relief."31 4  Moreover, "[a]llegations of defendant's acts directed
toward the general public or persons other than these plaintiffs,
whether years before the lawsuit was fied, or during the pendency
of this suit, do not relate to the standing of these plaintiffs to
maintain this suit."31 5 Thus, the "sole threat of future harm to
plaintiffs is hypothetical, not real and immediate." 3 6 Finally, the
court was unable to envision what type of relief would redress




ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc.,318 is cited
extensively for its holding that because plaintiffs would not camp
in a public park that contained a display of a lighted cross, they
showed sufficient injury in fact to separate them from the general
public who may be merely offended by the display.319 In this case,
the court recognized that Valley Forge emphasized that there is no
"sliding scale" of standing, and that "a mere spiritual stake in the
312. Id. at 1173.
313. Id. Given the holding of Valley Forge, it is unclear why the court should even
concern itself with those psychological "harms." Plaintiff Schmidt has had personal contact
with acts of the defendant such as: 1) the "defendant wrote plaintiff Schmidt a letter on her
official letterhead in which defendant questioned plaintiff's integrity and patriotism, criticized
plaintiff's religious beliefs, and revealed defendant's 'religious motivation' for hanging the
posters;" 2) "defendant mailed plaintiff Schmidt a tract about the Bible;" 3) "defendant made
'disparaging remarks about plaintiff Schmidt's religious faith and practices;" and 4)
"defendant sent plaintiff Schmidt another letter in which she 'likened herself and her official
mission to those of Jesus Christ.'" Id. Here, the court mentioned that even though plaintiff
Schmidt's contact with the alleged offensive acts were "less direct, more limited, more
infrequent, and more avoidable than the contact in Foremaster" and not on a daily basis,
that did not make her standing claim insufficient Id. at 1174.
314. Schmidt, 127 F Supp. 2d at 1174.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 1175.
317. Id.
318. 698 F2d 1098 (11th Cir. 1983).
319. Rabun County, 698 F2d at 1108.
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outcome nor an intense commitment to separation of church and
state is a 'permissible substitute for a showing of injury itself.'"320
In addition, the court noted that the psychological consequence of
observing conduct with which one disagrees is not a sufficient
injury for standing purposes. 321
The court relied on Sierra Club to differentiate between a
"representative of the public" and individual members of that club
whose use of the park would be affected by the government's
action.3 22 However, the death knell for the defendants in this case
was the court's application of Schempp. The court stated that
because the plaintiffs in this case were "forced to assume special
320. Id. at 1103 (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 765-66).
321. Id. (citing Valley Forge 454 U.S. at 766). Here, the plaintiffs consisted of five
residents of Georgia and the ACLU of Georgia. The plaintiffs alleged that their beneficial
right of use and enjoyment of a state park had been deprived and that, therefore, they have
suffered an injury in fact. Id. All of the plaintiffs alleged that they would not use the park on
account of the cross, but only two of the plaintiffs were actually campers who refused to
camp in the park. Id. at 1103-04.
322. Id. at 1104 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735-36). Notably, however, the Eleventh
Circuit failed to distinguish between the types of harm between a case that involves actual
adverse impact to the environment as the result of a road to be constructed in a National
Park, and the psychological consequence of observing conduct with which one disagrees and
thereby refusing to use a park merely because it contains a "religious" display. On the one
hand, any two people who use the park in the first example would have standing because
their use of the park has actually been diminished by the government action of altering the
ecology of the park. There would be no need to delve into the subjective thoughts of the
person asserting standing. On the other hand, if two people see a religious display in a park
and the one person avoids using the park because the display offends him, his actions are
the result of a psychological consequence of observing conduct with which he merely
disagrees which, is insufficient for standing purposes. In other words, the first example
shows that anyone using the park has been deprived somewhat of the beneficial use and
enjoyment of the park; however, the second example shows that it is the person's spiritual,
psychological, or constitutional beliefs that are relied upon to determine whether his use of
the park is diminished. These are examples of what Valley Forge has held to be insufficient
to confer standing. The court also cited Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) for the proposition that "outside the context of taxpayer
standing cases, a noneconomic injury was sufficient to confer standing to assert any type of
constitutional right." Rabun County, 698 F.2d at 1105 (purporting to cite Duke, 438 U.S. at
78-79). What the Court actually stated in Duke was that "[w]here a party champions his own
rights, and where the injury alleged is a concrete and particularized one which will be
prevented or redressed by the relief requested, the basic practical and prudential concerns
underlying the standing doctrine are generally satisfied when the constitutional requisites are
met." Duke, 438 U.S. at 80-81. Thus, reading what the Court actually stated, there must be
more than just a "constitutional right" for standing; moreover, the court's reliance on this
language is somewhat suspect given that Valley Forge had already been decided at the time
and delineated the elements of standing in an establishment clause case. See Valley Forge,
454 U.S. at 472. The court also relied on Allen v. Hickel, 424 F2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970) as
precedent, a case that granted standing to plaintiffs who alleged that they avoided a national
park to avoid looking at a crbche. This circuit court case preceded Valley Forge by 12 years.
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burdens" to avoid the cross, their injury was similar to the injury of
the schoolchildren in Schempp. Moreover, the court opined that the
plaintiffs had demonstrated an "individualized injury" and not a
"mere psychological reaction" suffered as a consequence of the
challenged action.3
In the case of Harvey v. Cobb County,324 a Ten Commandments
display was at issue. First, the court addressed the standing
issue.3 25 The court paid lip service to Valley Forge, but then decided
the citizen standing issue in relation to Harvey on the basis of
Schempp and the Rabun County decision.326 In this case, the court
did not require the plaintiffs to allege that they assumed any
special burden to avoid the plaque.327 The court stated that it was
enough that Harvey's law practice brought him into direct
unwelcome contact with the panel on a regular basis, which sets
him apart from the general public, and, thus, he had citizen
standing.32 The court stated that Cunningham had taxpayer
standing because of the above "cleaning and moving expenditures"
that the court said constituted the use of tax revenues, however
323. Rabun County, 698 F.2d at 1107-08. Why the plaintiffs needed to avoid the park, if
not because of the consequence of their psychological reaction to viewing the cross, was not
explained. In Schempp, by statute, schoolchildren were under state compulsion to attend
school, required to hear and/or recite Bible verses and recite the Lord's Prayer or ask to be
excused therefrom. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 209-12. In religious display cases, there are no
religious exercises that anyone is forced to participate in, i.e., there is no statute or
ordinance mandating compulsory viewing of the object, one may look or not look as they
please. The burden that the school children assumed in Schempp was necessary to avoid
what were otherwise requirements of religious participation mandated by the state. Thus,
one is not forced to undergo any burden to avoid compulsory religious exercises in a
religious display case, because looking upon the object is not mandatory. Neither are the
plaintiffs in this case 'impressionable schoolchildren." The only thing "forcing" these
plaintiffs to assume any burden of not seeing the object is their own psychological reaction
to the challenged conduct.
324. 811 F Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
325. Plaintiff Harvey is a criminal defense attorney that has a statewide practice and
has had 5 or 6 cases in the past year in the courthouse, with another scheduled. Harvey, 811
F Supp. at 673. He passes by the panel on a regular basis while there and does not avoid or
"seek out the panel." Id. He is "offended" by the display of "a religious symbol . . . in a
secular courthouse." Id. He believes that it sends a message to some of his clients that they
are "starting unequal" in the Cobb County Court system. Id. Harvey has not modified his
behavior or altered his law practice because of the panel. Id. Plaintiff Cunningham is a
taxpayer in Cobb County. Id. In the past three years he has been in the State Court Building
approx. twenty times and has seen the panel many times. Id. He has been there as a
defendant and as a juror. Id. He views the panel as "purely religious" and as indicative of the
influence of religion in general and Christianity in particular on "our government" and court
system. Id. He has not modified his behavior because of the display. Id.
326. Id. at 674-75. See supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.




In Alabama Freethought Ass'n v. Moore,m the court dismissed
plaintiffs' challenge to a Ten Commandment's plaque in Judge Roy
Moore's courtroom and the opening prayer used in his courtroom
for lack of standing. Plaintiffs' alleged that they must assume
special burdens to avoid the conduct of prayer and observation of
the plaque. They felt that defendant's conduct symbolized
government endorsement and approval of religion and they were
offended.3' Notably, the court examined in detail just exactly
where, when, why, and how each plaintiff's daily routine brings
them into contact with the complained of practice.3
2
The district court analyzed plaintiffs' claims under "citizen" and
"taxpayer" standing. The court found that the constitutional
minimum requirements for standing are: (1) an injury in fact that is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) causal relationship between the
injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable ruling that is not too
speculative.m In addition, where a plaintiff seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief (i.e., "forward-looking relief"), the injury-in-fact
must be particularized and imminent; there must be a "real and
immediate threat of future harm."m For taxpayer standing,
plaintiffs must allege and prove: (1) that the complaining party is a
municipal taxpayer, and (2) that municipal funds are being spent
on the challenged activities.m
Here, plaintiffs did not have standing because they neither
alleged nor provided evidence that their business affairs or other
activities include their making regular appearances in defendant's
courtroom.3 Neither did plaintiffs allege or offer evidence that
they would be subjected to undue burdens to avoid the allegedly
offensive conduct.3 7 Furthermore, there was not a scintilla of
evidence that plaintiffs must come into direct and unwelcome
329. Id. at 675-76.
330. 893 F Supp. 1522, 1545 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
331. Moore, 893 F Supp. at 1524-25.
332. Id. at 1533-42.
333. Id. at 1530 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Simon, 426 U.S. at 4142; AUen, 468 U.S.
at 752; and Valiey Forge, 454 U.S. at 472).
334. Id. (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2104-05 (1995);
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2).
335. Id. at 1532.
336. Moore, 893 F Supp. at 154041.
337. Id. at 1541.
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contact with the plaque to participate in their local government and
fulfill their legal obligations.3 s Moreover, plaintiffs' allegations that
defendant's display and conduct offends them is no more than a
subjective complaint of harm, and is not sufficient to establish the
objective injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing.19 Indeed,
"plaintiffs' status as active participants in public debate, and as
vociferous opponents of defendant's activities, is simply too thin a
mantle in which to cloak their standing to litigate .... 'Standing is
not measured by the intensity of the litigant's interest or the fervor
of his advocacy.' '" 4 The court dismissed plaintiffs' taxpayer
standing allegations by noting that they did not allege that a
measurable appropriation of tax revenue is being spent on
defendant's display or that any money whatsoever is spent on
maintaining the plaque.3
IV. How "RELIGIOUS DIsPLAY" NON-ECONOMIC STANDING SHOULD BE
ANALYZED - A TYPICAL SCENARIO
The typical "religious display" scenario usually arises when an
organization such as the Americans United for Separation of
Church and Statem or the ACLU- files a civil complaint in any
one of the 97 United States District Courts alleging that some
type of "display" violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.m Because of the proliferation of lawsuits involving
338. Id. The court distinguished Rabun County on the basis that none of the instant
plaintiffs were repeatedly subjected to the allegedly unconstitutional conduct in their regular
course of business or pleasure. Id. at 1540.
339. Id.
340. Id. (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486).
341. Moore, 893 F Supp. at 1542.
342. This organization of approximately 60,000 members, formed coincidentally in 1947
(the same year Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) was decided), purports to
protect the religious liberty that "[ojur forefathers fought, bled and died" for. About AU, at
http-/www.au.org/about/htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2001). AU's actions and ideology show that
nothing could be further from the truth. AU filed a civil complaint challenging a plaque
affixed to the Allegheny County Courthouse entitled The Commandments in the Western
District of Pennsylvania on March 20, 2001. See Modrovich v. Allegheny County, No. 01-531
(W.D. Pa filed Mar. 20, 2001).
343. On November 27, 2001, the ACLU of Kentucky challenged Ten Commandments
postings in Garrard, Grayson, Mercer, and Rowan county courthouses. See ACLU of
Kentucky Files Suit Over Government-Endorsed Ten Commandments Postings in Four
Kentucky Counties, at http://www.aclu-ky.org/tencommands-roundtwo.htm (Nov.27, 2001).
344. See 28 U.S.C. § 133.
345. On October 30, 2001, both AU and the ACLU of Alabama joined forces in filing a
lawsuit to remove a granite monument of the Ten Commandments that Chief Justice Roy
Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court had erected in the rotunda of the Alabama Judicial
Building in Montgomery, Alabama. Steve Benen, Monumental Mistake: Alabama Chief
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various displays of the Ten Commandments in recent years,36 this
article will use such a scenario as the basis for the type of
allegations normally asserted in those cases.
As illustrated in the preceding survey of circuit and district court
decisions involving the citizen standing, plaintiffs will raise a
variety of allegations in an effort to obtain standing in "religious
display" cases. For example, a plaintiff may allege that he has seen
the display a specific number of times and, in addition, may allege
that his future travels will take him past the display. On the other
hand, a plaintiff might allege that he routinely sees the display as a
result of his normal daily activities. Often, but not always, there
will be allegations that the plaintiff must alter his route to avoid
"contact" with the display. Next, the plaintiff normally avers that
the display is an endorsement of religion and that because he does
not believe or agree with the "religious" nature of the display, the
government must, therefore, view him in one of three ways: (1) as
someone on the margins of society; (2) that the government is
trying to establish an official religious tradition; and/or (3) that the
government does not view him as a legitimate member of the
community. Finally, a plaintiff may include allegations that the
display is offensive and that he disagrees with it either
philosophically and/or constitutionally.
The problem with these typical allegations is that they do not
establish any injury caused by the display unless the court
considers the underlying merits of the plaintiff's claim. The
allegations of endorsement, being on the "margins of society,"
establishing an "official religious tradition," and not being viewed
as a legitimate member of the community are "buzz-words" that go
to the merits of the plaintiff's Establishment Clause claim?'
7
Justice Roy Moore Sparks Federal Lawsuit With Granite Ten Commandments In The State
Judicial Building, at http://www.au.org/churchstate/csl2012.htm (Dec. 2001).
346. See Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000); Suhre v. Haywood
County, 131 F.3d 1083 (4th Cir. 1997); Adland v. Russ, 107 F. Supp. 2d 782 (E.D. Ky. 2000);
ACLU v. Pulaski County, Ky., 96 F Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Ky. 2000); ACLU v. McCreary County,
Ky., 96 F. Supp. 2d 679 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Doe v. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 96 F. Supp. 2d 667
(E.D. Ky. 2000); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, Ind., 119 F Supp. 2d 856 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Ind.
Civil Liberties Union Inc. v. O'Bannon, 110 F. Supp. 2d 842 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Ala. Freethought
Ass'n v. Moore, 893 F Supp. 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
347. "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community...." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623-36 (detailing the endorsement analysis) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)). Any allegation that the government views such a Plaintiff as someone on the
margins of society is nothing short of ludicrous. That exceedingly rare term has been used in
only a handful of state and federal court opinions to refer to persons who are among the
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Allegations such as these do not assert any type of palpable injury
to the plaintiff as a result of viewing the display. Although many of
the court cases analyzed herein have allowed plaintiffs to establish
standing on the barest supporting allegations in Establishment
Clause cases, this relaxed standard has allowed the federal courts
to become political debating arenas for those who have
philosophical differences with the government.
In order to illustrate why the Court has interpreted the Article III
case or controversy requirement to insist on the demonstration of
an injury-in-fact before a court can address the merits of the
plaintiff's claim, consider the following. One of the plaintiff's
allegations in a "religious display" case obviously will aver that the
challenged display is religious. However, the issue of religiosity of
the display is a core element of an Establishment Clause test. Thus,
a plaintiff would have to admit that he has no case if, after passing
the standing threshold, he is unable to prove that the display
somehow has a religious purpose, has the principal or primary
effect of advancing religion, or excessively entangles the
government with religion.m Thus, the allegation that the display is
"religious" is irrelevant to the standing issue because the plaintiff
must first allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, caused by
the display, before he can argue the merits of his Establishment
Clause claim.
In other words, assume that a plaintiff, who happens to be a
Quaker, has filed suit challenging a display that consists of several
war memorial monuments on the basis that they violate the
Establishment Clause. For instance, he alleges that the government,
through the monuments, is promoting religious traditions that have
conceded the necessity of war, but because the plaintiff's religious
beliefs consider war to be sinful, the government's display is highly
offensive to the plaintiff and thus, constitutes an establishment of
religion. At first blush, this plaintiff's complaint would appear easy
to dismiss because it would seem that there is no way that the
display of war memorials could violate the Establishment Clause.
criminal element of society or those in the depths of poverty in our society. See United
States v. Hauptman, 111 F3d 48, 52 (7th Cir. 1997) (using the term "margins of society" as
the general phrase to complete an ejusdem generis of the specific terms "ignorant,
impoverished, desperate, and deranged"); see also Commonwealth v. Means, 773 A-2d 142
(Pa. 2001). A Plaintiff would be hard pressed to provide evidence to support his belief that
the government viewed him, or ever viewed him, as such.
348. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lemon test is normally applied in some
fashion to "religious display" cases.
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However, may the court just assume jurisdiction and dismiss the
case based on the assumption that the case appears unlikely that
the Plaintiff could prevail? The answer is that courts are no longer
permitted to assume hypothetical jurisdiction and, therefore, the
court would have to address whether this plaintiff has standing to
proceed with his claim in federal court- 49 Thus, the court must
assure itself that the plaintiff has standing before it could consider
the merits of whether the war memorial monuments actually
established a religious tradition or even consider whether the
government justifies participation in war because of the religious
beliefs of the local politiciansa3° Moreover, even though plaintiff's
chances of prevailing on the merits may look bleak, it is doubtful
that it could be said that plaintiff's claim is "entirely frivolous."
351
Consider also a government display that honors famous
humanists. Would a fundamentalist Christian plaintiff be able to
assert that the display violates the Establishment Clause because
the government appears to be establishing the religion of secular
humanism? The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
that secular humanism is a religion for First Amendment
purposes.352 Certainly, a complaint challenging such a display would
appear to be meritorious provided that the plaintiff could satisfy
the standing requirements.
Consequently, the plaintiffs' allegations in these cases, if similar
to the allegations in most "religious display" cases, would perhaps
include the following. Plaintiffs may state that they are offended by
war or humanism and, every time they see war or humanism
honored by the government, they are offended. In addition, these
plaintiffs would most likely allege that because of the presence of
the war memorial monuments or humanism display, the
government is endorsing religions that do not consider war sinful
or the religion of secular humanism, and therefore, makes them
feel like outsiders in the political community and/or on the margins
of society. Would these allegations be sufficient to confer standing?
349. See supra notes 275-79 and accompanying text.
350. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 95.
351. See Id. at 97, n.2. An increased burden on plaintiffs to show a real, distinct, and
palpable injury would also make it unnecessary in most cases for the court to determine
whether a claim is frivolous because unless plaintiff's burden was met, the case could be
dismissed on standing.
352. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961) (stating that "[a]mong
religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in
the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others").
366 Vol. 40:313
Standing in "Religious Display" Cases
An objective look at plaintiffs' "injuries" in these two hypothetical
situations, reveal that the only "injuries" asserted by the plaintiffs is
that they have been offended and that they allege that the
constitution has been violated because of the "religious" nature of
the displays and that the displays endorse religion. Under Valley
Forge, plaintiffs who "fail to identify any personal injury suffered
by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other
than the psychological consequence presumably produced by
observation of conduct with which one disagrees," have not alleged
an injury sufficient to confer standing, "even though the
disagreement is phrased in constitutional terms."35 Thus,
plaintiffs allegations of religiosity and endorsement go to the merits
of the underlying establishment clause claim and not to the issue of
standing.
However, because several circuits have found allegations such as
these sufficient to confer standing, as illustrated by the
hypotheticals, there is virtually no limit to the displays that an
imaginative plaintiff could challenge in federal court. In other
words, if the district courts were to acknowledge standing based
on mere statements of the elements of a cause of action, almost
anyone could manufacture standing merely by reciting the elements
of Lemon or the endorsement test or any number of "tests" the
Court has announced from time to time without the need for
showing a distinct and palpable injury to himself. Clearly, the
function of the federal courts is not to be the debating forum on
whether plaques, memorials, or other types of displays on
government property violate the Constitution. Although these
hypothetical suits may sound a bit far-fetched, they illustrate the
following point: the underlying Constitutional claim one is bringing
makes no difference, "Art. III's requirement remains: the plaintiff
still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself."M Thus,
take away plaintiffs reliance upon the claim that the Establishment
Clause has been violated, either in these hypothetical cases, or in
the actual "religious display" cases that are filed, and there is
simply no injury. Plaintiffs allege that the Constitution has been
violated -they allege nothing else.
Many of the cases examined herein take into account the
regularity of the plaintiff's contact with the "offensive" display. To
begin with, intermittent viewing of the display or purposeful
353. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86 (emphasis added).
354. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
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viewing of the display for litigation should be entirely insufficient
to establish any type of injury in fact.355 Additionally, "[p]ast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case
or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by
any continuing, present adverse effects."356 Moreover, vague
allegations of incurring an injury at some obscure, indefinite time
in the future is far too speculative to satisfy the imminence
requirement of standing.357 Likewise, a plaintiff who avers that he
plans to purposefully walk by the display in the future is nothing
more than an attempt to manufacture an alleged injury. This is
simply an unacceptable manipulation of Article In's standing
requirement designed to make a mockery of the judicial system by
plaintiffs whose only "injury" is an admitted philosophical and
constitutional difference with the government and the way they feel
the constitution ought to be interpreted. More commonly, however,
the plaintiff will allege that he passes the display virtually every
day. Again, should it really matter whether a plaintiff passes a
display once, or passes it twice every day, if there is no distinct,
palpable injury as a result of his viewing the display?
Some of the court cases examined herein have found an
injury-in-fact if the plaintiff was "forced" to change his behavior or
alter his route because of the display. The position of this paper is
that if a plaintiff alters his route to avoid contact with a display,
that is nothing more than the psychological consequence of viewing
a display that one finds offensive; therefore, because "psychological
offense" is insufficient for standing under Valley Forge, this
allegation should not be considered evidence of an injury-in-fact.
Nonetheless, at the very minimum, a plaintiff should have to allege,
plead, and prove a change of behavior, because of the display, for
evidence of an injury. This line of reasoning is consistent with the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Zielke where the court dismissed
plaintiffs' case for lack of standing because the plaintiffs
355. The case of ACLU-NJ v. Township of Wall ACLU-NJ, No. 00-2075, 2001 WL 320914
(3d Cir. Apr. 3, 2001) is instructive. In ACLU-NJ, the court noted that the plaintiffs lack of
contact with the alleged offensive holiday display was insufficient to establish Article III
standing. Id. at *7. In addition, the court noted that contact with a display only for the
purposes of litigation does not support the evidentiary requisite of proof needed to sustain
plaintiff's burden for obtaining standing. Id.
356. Moore, 893 F Supp. at 1536 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102).
357. Id. at 1536 n.26. Indeed the Moore court stated that "[i]mminence .. .has been
stretched beyond the breaking point when, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury at
some indefinite future time, and the acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least
partly within the plaintiff's own control." Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2).
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"conced[ed] that they did not alter their behavior in any manner as
a result of the Ten Commandments monument; they allege[d] only
that they have 'suffered a rebuke to [their] religious beliefs.'"35s The
court may have found a distinct and palpable injury if plaintiffs had
refused to go to the park where the Ten Commandments
monument was displayed because they would have alleged that
their right to use the public park had been adversely affected by
the monument's presence. 359 Consistent with this analysis, a plaintiff
that alleges that he intends to continue walking the same route and
continue to pass the display on a regular basis has shown no
change in behavior and therefore, not even the most minimal
averment of injury.
Along this line, even if plaintiff walks by the plaque daily, his
proximity to the plaque is not relevant in determining whether he
has suffered an injury-in-fact. For example, plaintiffs allegations
that they live in and/or work in the geographical proximity of the
display and see the display regularly, are no different than the AU's
members in Valley Forge who lived in Pennsylvania and may have
seen the college or even may have lived next to the college. The
Court found that these allegations are irrelevant because they do
not "establish[] an injury where none existed before."36° Thus,
whether a plaintiff passes by the plaque every day, or whether he
has seen it only once, is immaterial without any allegation that the
plaque has injured him apart from any psychological and
constitutional differences that the plaintiff avers. On the other
hand, if a Maryland resident visiting the State of Indiana were
forced by a government official in Indianapolis to read or obey a
"religious display," that person may have a cognizable injury even
though he has only seen the display once, despite the fact that he
is a Maryland resident.
358. Zielke, 845 F2d at 1468. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit in the Books case
disregarded its own precedent and allowed standing to the plaintiffs in that case based on an
imaginative reading of Doe v. County of Montgomery, 41 F3d 1156 (7th Cir. 1994). In County
of Montgomery, the court held that plaintiffs' had standing because they could not avoid
coming into direct contact with a sign over the entrance to the courthouse that read: "THE
WORLD NEEDS GOD." County of Montgomery, 41 F. 3d at 1159 (emphasis added). In Books,
however, the court stated that even though the plaintiffs could have altered their route to
avoid the monument, they need not do so because the plaintiffs were merely aware of the
text of the monument even if they don't see it. Books, 235 F3d at 300-01 (emphasis added).
359. Zielke, 845 F2d at 1468.
360. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n.23; see also City of Edmond, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 802
(Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that plaintiffs "mere presence
in the city, without further allegations as to injury, quite clearly fails to meet the standing
requirements laid down in cases such as Valley Forge").
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Plaintiffs may also allege that they must come into contact with
the "religious display" to participate as citizens in the government.
However, if the plaintiffs have not been coerced to look at the
display, participate in any governmental "policies or goals"
regarding the display, or alter their behavior in any way because of
the display's presence, how does mere contact with the display
establish an injury? Of course, plaintiffs may feel stigmatized
because the display offends their own beliefs or lack thereof.
Nonetheless, the court addressed this argument stating that even if
plaintiffs felt "stigmatized" by the government's action, "such
[stigmatizing] injury accords a basis for standing only to 'those
persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the
challenged discriminatory conduct'-.361 Thus, the display must also
be a substantial factor in the causation chain. If the display is
merely one of a multitude of items that offend a plaintiff because
of his different beliefs, there is an ample likelihood that the
removal of the display would only lessen a plaintiffs offense
somewhat, and not totally redress his alleged offended feelings.
Consequently, if the government has never treated the plaintiff
differently than the citizens at large, and he has never been denied
equal services despite his "different" beliefs, the plaintiff is simply
indistinguishable from the public at large and unable to show any
particularized injury-in-fact.
V. CONCLUSION
Religious display suits actually provide no concrete benefit to the
plaintiffs and, like many suits that are "brought to . . . 'determine
questions of law in thesi,' . . . [they] are most often inspired by the
psychological smart of perceived official injustice by the
government-policy preferences of political activists."3 2 Clearly, the
relief that most plaintiffs request through their allegations, removal
of the display, would not remedy their alleged injuries and, at most
it would make them feel less offended. "[A]lthough a suitor may
derive great comfort and joy from the fact that [the Establishment
361. Reagan, 786 F.2d at 201 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 755; quoting Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)) (brackets in original). Indeed the Allen Court
recognized that "[i]f the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would extend
nationwide to all members of the particular [religious] group" and "[r]ecognition of standing
in such circumstances would transform the federal courts in to 'no more than a vehicle for
the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.'" Allen, 468 U.S. at 755-56
(quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687 (1973)).
362. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103 n.5 (quoting Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325, 330 (1885)).
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Clause not be violated], that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or
that the nation's laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic
satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does
not redress a cognizable Article III injury."3
Potential plaintiffs may argue that in religious display cases, if
they do not have standing to sue, how will anyone ever be able to
challenge a "religious display"? This argument was also answered in
Valley Forge:
This philosophy has no place in our constitutional scheme....
Respondents' claim of standing implicitly rests on the
presumption that violations of the Establishment Clause
typically will not cause injury sufficient to confer standing
under the "traditional view of Art. III. But "the assumption
that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one
would have standing, is not a reason to find standing."
• . . [W]e are unwilling to assume that injured parties are
nonexistent simply because they have not joined respondents
in their suit.6
Thus, absent any allegations that plaintiffs have truly suffered some
type of palpable injury from the plaque, reliance upon the political
process, not the courts, is not only proper; it is totally consistent
with our form of government. Indeed, the fact that there is no
palpable injury in most religious display cases is a strong indication
that there has been no violation of the Establishment Clause.
Citizens who harbor this type of generalized grievance against
religious displays are directed to seek legislative solutions, not
judicial ones. The federal courts are not "college debating societies"
designed for the pleasure of would-be Establishment Clause
watchdogs.
David Harvey
363. Id. at 107 (emphasis added).
364. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 489 (quoting Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227) (emphasis
added). The Court in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) went one step further
stating:
In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process. Any other conclusion
would mean that the Founding Fathers intended to set up something in the nature of
an Athenian democracy or a New England town meeting to oversee the conduct of
the National Government by means of lawsuits in federal courts.
Id. at 179.
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